THE INCORPORATION OF SACRIFICE:

THE AMERICAN AMBULANCE FIELD SERVICE
AND THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER MOTOR-AMBULANCE CORPS,
1914-1917

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"There must be some to find no consolation whatever and some to sneer at those who buy the cheap emotion of sacrifice," Randolph Bourne wrote with a sense of desperation while his countrymen hastily mobilized for their entry into the blood bath of the European War.¹ In June 1917, however, Bourne’s plea had little effect. Not many Americans sneered at "sacrifice" and instead cherished the ideals of individual honor to be had on the battlefields of France. But just as Bourne argued, in a society which produced progressive ideas of efficiency and experienced unprecedented urbanization and rationalization, knightly rhetoric seemed out of step with reality. Bitterly, Bourne pointed his finger at the way in which an Eastern elite tied these antiquated ideals to their own ideological program, in an effort to preserve leadership in a new national unity. Indeed, amidst an imagery of chivalry, heroism, crusading adventures, and battling knights, the country in the summer of 1917 displayed an archaic idealism which today seems both distant and alien. As many scholars have observed, the Great War itself would come to separate our own times from the images Randolph Bourne wished his countrymen to abjure.

Among the scholars who have portrayed this change most convincingly is Henry F. May.² The disillusionment of the twenties, May argued, had its roots in the prewar years when Americans held to a sense of cultural stability, a belief in unalterable progress, and the validity of their moral ideals. As cultural and social tensions associated with urbanization and immigration within America rose in the years before 1917, an Eastern elite tied its nineteenth-century values to the Allied cause abroad and propagated preparedness and intervention at home. When many of Bourne’s intellectual companions followed President Woodrow Wilson into the war camp, and thus left Bourne and his intellectual opposition essentially to himself, a self-defeating ideological situation had been set up. Intellectuals such as John Dewey rallied around Wilson’s war program to "make the world safe for democracy," thus tying to the Great War their hope for certain success of progressive liberal ideas. With the "lost peace" and the bitter end of the Wilsonian vision at the end of the war, however, this mixture catalyzed the pre-war idealism into the harsher atmosphere of disillusionment characteristic of the twenties. Other historians have taken up May’s ideas and illustrated their diverse and implicit facets.

Michael Pearlman focused his discussion of prewar America on some of those whom May called the "custodians of culture."³ While remaining within the basic framework May had provided earlier, Pearlman detailed its key components of class ideology.

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East-coast patricians, he argued, advocated military training camps, Universal Military Training, and other preparedness measures as integrative social tools aimed at stabilizing their own guiding role. Pearlman focused his discussion on these conservative forces and charted their path into the twenties and thirties where he found their patriotism stale, rigidly conservative, and disillusioned with their own country. As both scholars agree, knightly rhetoric had no place in post-war America.

Yet while the Great War can be taken as the metaphoric conclusion of nineteenth-century ideals, the war also amplified and installed new ideas in American society, some of which clearly stretch into our own time. One of the sources for these ideas was mobilization itself which conferred upon the federal government unprecedented powers. Indeed, war mobilization, despite its frequently improvisational character, bequeathed the American people an era more collective in character and national in scope. In the twenties, standardization and large-scale production, as well as an emerging mass culture, would rely on operational skills and ideals used by a recent generation of professionals trained in the war. These managers carried into the twenties a new understanding of the value of marketing, large-scale production for national and international markets, and standardization as the motto of industrial efficiency and maximizing profit.

As David Kennedy has observed, managers of war mobilization as well as many others of their generation were acutely aware that they negotiated between individual and collective eras. Robert Wiebe, furthermore, has pointed to the bureaucratic war apparatus as the symbolic initiator of a new mode of control which sounded the theme for new ideological tools, surpassing their predecessors in size and efficiency. As Wiebe pointed out, the continuity of war policies into the twenties must be attributed to such World War I managers as Bernard Baruch and Herbert Hoover. Thus, while May pointed to the end of an innocent idealism as American troops boarded the steamers for France, Wiebe stressed that while the war stripped the twenties of the earlier idealism, it provided American society with a staff of professional administrators, cherishing efficiency as a tool to achieve corporate growth, and cooperating with the government to achieve their aims. Yet while May, Kennedy, and Wiebe discuss different aspects of the war, they all acknowledge that World War I represented a significant watershed in American social life. While many changes were implicit in prewar events, the Great War itself, at least metaphorically, separated the nineteenth century from our own days.

In this thesis, I introduce two patrician characters who, at the beginning of the war in Europe, took their nineteenth-century ideals from a proper and studious environment of New England across the Atlantic to the mud of war-torn France three thousand miles away. Two and a half years before their own country would enter the "European War," Abram Piatt Andrew and Richard Norton already organized volunteer ambulance sections along the Western front. From 1914 until 1917, they attracted more than 2,500 American volunteers, many of whom were lured to France by prospects of danger and the kind of sacrifice Bourne despised. The front and the firing line provided them with a

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modern "frontier," challenging and, supposedly, baptizing the individual volunteer as he steered his ambulance through heavy shelling. In their understanding of what their ambulance service meant, both Andrew and Norton represented many ideas which where then characteristic of a conservative Eastern elite.

Their traditional liberal individualism, which was one of these conservative characteristics, was best depicted by their voluntary work behind the trenches. Their voluntarism tied into antiquated notions one observer called "noblesse oblige," a service of good will by those who could afford it. Their work in France thus reflected their eagerness to reassert social leadership at home. As "custodians of culture," furthermore, both Andrew and Norton dedicated themselves to the Allied cause, a cause they understood, or at least wished to see, as a struggle for civilization and the cultural values they cherished. Accordingly, they disparaged President Woodrow Wilson’s reluctance to be drawn into the bloody conflict between the European countries. Their own country, they agreed, should participate and aid civilized France in her struggle against the onslaught of the "Hun."

Thus, both Andrew and Norton put two important ideas to work in their ambulance corps. One was an antiquated liberal ideology which stressed the individual's responsibility and self-reliance in the market-place and in society; the other was their understanding of nationalism and the dedication to their own nation. This peculiar kind of nationalism took for granted that their own "gentleman" type would direct this nation's affairs. As nationalists, they rejoiced as American soldiers sailed for France to join the battle their ambulance armies had fought for over two years.

In the summer of 1917, however, Andrew’s and Norton’s conservative individualism was challenged by the very nationalism they had encouraged. Suddenly, Andrew and Norton found their earlier ideals to be contradictory. As an assistant professor of economics, Andrew had argued in favor of "the least possible amount of state interference with business." Now the American army and the American Red Cross appeared as large institutions ready to put American ambulance sections in France under their banner of efficiency and patriotism. Both men now saw their ideals of liberal individualism and an elitist "noblesse oblige" threatened by the steady rhythm of army life. The spirit of the recruit, they found, differed markedly from the voluntary dedication of earlier days. Thus the appearance of the army challenged the very basis of their earlier motivation. As the two ambulance corps tried to decide whether to accept the military commissions offered to them by the Army, a new demand for patriotic duty and nationalism stood against their liberal ideals of former days. Both men faced a crucial choice.

No two people fully represent an era. The two ambulance corps, furthermore, stemmed from a quite particular American background which was far from representative in 1917. I want to propose, however, that these two conservative volunteers characterized important aspects of larger transformations underway in American society at the time. By declining the commission offered to him, Norton denied consent to a state which would

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deny his liberal assumptions and independence. His mid-Victorian principle of self-reliance proved stronger than his willingness to subordinate himself to a national military machine. The ambulancier’s disenchantment and the failure of his ideals in 1917 reflected the demise of ideals then propagated by "custodians of culture," conservative East-coast patricians in defense of nineteenth-century values. Indeed, Norton represented the end of the nineteenth century.

Given the same choice, Andrew accepted the commission the Army offered him. The ambulancier thus indicated the extent to which organizational ideas were better suited to the acceptance of a new hierarchy than were the inflexible ideals of mid-Victorian character. In 1916, Andrew had vigorously enlarged his ambulance corps, turning a small organization attached to a hospital into a huge educational facility for sons of wealthy families at home. His public relations methods included the publication of books, organization of lecture tours, and utilization of movies on the yet peaceful "home front." Furthermore, Andrew's ambulanciers steered through the mud behind the trenches what would become the symbol of a coming mass culture: the Ford Model T. Thus, Andrew had shown that his mindset allowed for progressive ideas. That Andrew accepted the offered rank illustrates his similar approval of a modernized American society. In this way, observations by Robert Wiebe help understand the continuity in American mobilization.

By closely describing the nature of these men’s organizations before 1917, their expectations as their own country entered the war, and their reactions to the appearance of the army, I want symbolically to portray larger shifts in American society. The history of the Andrew’s American Ambulance Field Service (AAFS) and Richard Norton’s American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps not only displays the discontinuity discussed by Henry F. May but at the same time shows the continuity and adaptability of (albeit conservative) progressive ideas as portrayed by Robert Wiebe. As the two ambulanciers show, these transformations presented themselves as real forces in this small segment of American life.

This thesis began as an investigation of the history of the AAFS. Hence most material I use pertains to this organization. However, I soon recognized that it shows but an interesting variant of a transformation in progress during these years. I then chose to extend my scope to include Richard Norton’s ambulance corps in order to contrast and highlight two different approaches to the same task. In doing so, I am using Andrew and Norton as foils for each other, contrasting and comparing their ideas and actions.

Consequently, this study aims to understand the leadership of two American volunteer ambulance organizations operating in France during the period of American neutrality. By portraying the work of these volunteers and their differing decisions in 1917,
I hope to shed some light on the larger transformations taking place in their time. One such transformation was the abandonment of the knightly rhetoric Norton and Andrew employed in their work within the firing line. Indeed, the following decade would not replace them with similarly hopeful and idealistic ideas. Randolph Bourne did not live to see the twenties. But had Bourne lived, he might have occasionally looked back to the prewar years with a romantic recollection of the hopes and promises before their demise in the midst of patriotism, enforced national unity, and a war not fought by knights and their swords, but by soldiers and their machine guns.

E. Cummings, Harry Crosby, Julian Green, and Malcolm Cowley. The technical aspects of the transportation of wounded, and the innovation brought about by these ambulance services, have most recently been described in John S. Haller, Jr., Farmcarts to Fords: A History of the Military Ambulance, 1790-1925 (Carbondale: University of Illinois Press, 1992).
The first time he drove, in a converted Rolls Royce he had furnished himself, a load of muddy bandaged pioux-pioux through the deep ruts of a shellpitted road from the lines to the quiet and the soothing smell of disinfectants of a field hospital, he felt a profound satisfaction both in the fact that he was not afraid of shellfire and in the fact that he was helping, while his own country in callous stupidity stood cravenly aloof, to defend civilization from the onslaught of a barbarian horde.

John Dos Passos, *Chosen Country.*
CHAPTER II

"BETTER THAN PEACE"

"The Price That Has to Be"

After the fatal shots of Sarajevo ignited what Americans until 1917 would call the "European War," the American community in Paris rallied around Ambassador Myron T. Herrick, who remained in the city despite the advance of German troops. Wealthy Americans, furthermore, took steps to help the French, and their efforts soon focused on the American Ambulance Hospital in the Parisian suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine. There, they put together a 300-bed hospital which opened its doors to the wounded of the battlefields at the beginning of September 1914.1

Initially, the founding of the American Ambulance Hospital was the result of local Americans’ dedication to the French and what they perceived as the urgency of the hour. During the following year, however, what began as an attempt to help the French turned into a major contribution to the preparedness and pro-war machine at home. Robert Bacon, once Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State and emerging as "practically a living embodiment of the whole preparedness movement," became the principal director of the hospital’s affairs in the United States.2 His wife put together a group of well-known women and raised the money needed for the operation of the institution. During the following years, the American Ambulance Hospital harbored an offspring of numerous organizations, all committed to aiding "civilized" France in her struggle against Germany.

In the following years of American neutrality, the American Ambulance Hospital emerged as an outlet for Americans cherishing upper middle-class values of character, "service," and sacrifice. The hospital found voluntary support by doctors from major universities in the United States; nurses applied to aid the institution without remuneration; and the automobile transportation sections of the hospital provided the most appealing adventure to many young men: to steer ambulance cars on the battlefields of the war.

One of the first ambulance drivers was Professor Richard Norton. The archeologist had studied in Germany and Greece, and spent most of his life as an art critic in institutions such as the American School of Classical Studies in Rome. Norton had just published a study on the Italian sculptor Bernini when he found himself in Europe at the outbreak of hostilities in Europe.3 Sensing the need for help in Paris, he climbed into an ambulance at the American Ambulance Hospital. "I think I may join this American Hospi-

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1New York Herald (Paris), 10 September 1914. The term "Ambulance" in French means hospital. Thus, the name American Ambulance was used interchangeably with "American Ambulance Hospital" [my italics].


tal," he wrote home. "They seem to need help." Norton then put together a group of ten cars and volunteers in London and sailed back to France in October. Under the auspices of the English St. John Ambulance Association, his group of drivers soon engaged in bringing wounded back from the battlefield and the sanitary trains. The American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps, as the organization came to be called, remained small through 1916. In 1916, he merged his efforts with those of Herman Harjes, the wealthy director of the Morgan-Harjes bank, which provided the French government with large American loans. From then on, Norton's sections operated under the banner of the American Red Cross.

In December 1914, Abram Piatt Andrew left his large villa in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and sailed from New York to join the ambulance section of the Ambulance Hospital in Neuilly. "I am relying upon you to find me a job where I can be helpful," he had written to his friend Robert Bacon. "I do not care what it is as long as I can be of service." Just two months prior to his embarkation for France, Andrew had suffered political defeat in his attempt to unseat the eminent Congressman Augustus Peabody Gardner in his home state of Massachusetts. The war provided him with the opportunity to change professions progressively. After his education at Princeton, Harvard, Berlin, Halle, and Paris, Andrew had been an assistant professor of economics at Harvard before 1909. After a short interlude as director of the Mint in 1909, Andrew served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury from 1910 to 1912, which he joined "enthusiastic over the opportunities for a more economical and scientific administration." While he was attracted to the Bull Moosers in 1912, he did not leave the ranks of the regular Republicans. Andrew found himself ejected from his government position, however, after his relationship with Secretary of the Treasury Franklin McVeagh grew increasingly estranged. Thus, leaving behind an academic and a political career that had come to a halt in 1914, the bachelor turned to benevolence and the French cause. Andrew, known as "Doc" in his small community of bachelors, artists, and well-to-do ladies in Gloucester, Massachusetts, left a gay life with friends such as Isabella Stewart Gardner, a Boston society dame and widow who liked to surround herself with charming young men.

Even before he left for France, Andrew had anticipated the adventure of his

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5Richard Norton to Sally [Sara Norton], ALS, 2 October 1914, Box 11, Richard Norton Papers.
9In January 1914, Andrew wrote to his parents about the various speaking engagements in relation to his candidacy. "So you can see I am not stagnating," he ensured them one and a half years after he had last occupied a paid position. Andrew to his parents, n.d., Andrew Gray Collection, Washington DC.

assignment in war-torn France. A couple of days before Andrew embarked for France, he and a friend motored home and "opened the throttle, imagining that we were in the war zone and had a message to deliver to General Joffre which must reach headquarters before 1 A.M." Among his friends, his decision to go to France and the front found favorable comments. Some, in fact, would later follow him and drive ambulances themselves. "'Doc is the only person around here who has any real red blood in him,'" one friend remarked.

Indeed, the adventurer understood his own decision to engage in dangerous work behind the front much as Theodore Roosevelt did. The latter would later call such work a "'service through the high gallantry of entire indifference to life.'" In spite of all the tragic details of your letters you seem utterly happy . . . ," his friend Henry Davis Sleeper wrote Andrew in March 1915, and added that if his friend could "combine absolute satisfaction with such fine service you have got what most men are after -- & the danger is the price that has to be." To Andrew, the ideas of "service," sacrifice, and danger were closely interwoven aspects of his ambulance work.

Within this particular concept of "service," danger was not merely a price, but an incentive to the forty-two year old bachelor. After Andrew’s arrival in France in early 1915, Bacon provided him with a position as driver for one of the hospital’s ambulance sections. The section was assigned work in Dunkirk, Belgium. There, in a letter to his parents Andrew described his perception of a bombing as a "spectacle . . . absorbing beyond anything I have ever seen. I suppose it was fraught with danger," he added, "but one almost forgot one’s self in wondering where the next bomb would drop." Andrew, furthermore, was eager to get closer to the action. He urged French officials to assign him evacuation work closer to the front. After Andrew had been with the ambulance service for six months, his description of the French army slipped from the third person into the first person plural; almost unconsciously Andrew was projecting himself as the citizen of a belligerent nation.

In February 1915, Andrew brought this experience to a new position at the American Ambulance Hospital. Robert Bacon fetched him from his assignment with the ambulance squad and made Andrew "Inspector-General" in charge of all the hospital’s

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12Henry Sleeper to Piatt Andrew, 30 March 1915, Hayden and Gray, Beauport Chronicle, 163.
14Henry Sleeper to Piatt Andrew, 4 March 1915, Hayden and Gray, Beauport Chronicle. Also see the Gloucester Times, 6 March 1915, "ANDREW DARES DEATH TO MINISTER TO WOUNDED," in A. Piatt Andrew’s scrapbook, Andrew Gray Collection.
15Andrew to his parents, 29 January 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 37.
16Andrew to his parents, 22 January 1915, Ibid., 34.
17Andrew to his parents, 2 July 1915, Ibid., 150. Andrew wrote that "our officers tried to hit them [the Germans]."
sections operating in the field, as distinguished from those operating in Paris. In the fall of 1914, the transportation sections of the American Ambulance Hospital had gone out to bring the wounded the sanitary trains which arrived in Paris at night, to the institution itself in Neuilly. Yet Andrew had different ideas about the future of the hospital's field service. In April 1915, Andrew envisioned an educational organization which would provide an experience uniquely dangerous, and, in turn, uniquely rewarding to its participants. "Many young Americans," Andrew reflected after the war, "were already stirring with the desire to participate in the great world drama, yet they could not do so as combatants without sacrifice of their nationality." An enlarged ambulance service, he concluded, could bring these men to the firing line as neutrals and under the protection of the Geneva Convention. Upon this idea the field service of the American Ambulance Hospital in Neuilly expanded during the following years.

Andrew's own section in Belgium had worked well behind the front, carrying the wounded from sanitary trains and dressing stations to hospitals in the rear. He now sought French approval for his plan to have the hospital's field service sections attached directly to the French army instead of hospitals. Work on the firing line would be more probable under this arrangement because his ambulanciers would then fetch wounded directly from the first aid shelters and dressing stations near the trenches. Cautiously, French officials agreed to a trial section to be sent to the Vosges in April 1915.

As assistant professor at Harvard, Andrew had appreciated the company of students at his home in Gloucester. Now, Andrew felt that college students were best suited for the important job of winning the approval of the French authorities. For the first section to serve closer to the front, Andrew reported, "I selected the men with the utmost care. . . . They are all college men. . . . From the point of view of a stock farm for breeding purposes, they leave nothing to be desired. . . The future of our service depends upon them," he concluded, "and I told them so." His efforts proved successful. Soon Andrew could write to his parents that the French had been convinced "what thoroughbred gentlemen they [his ambulance drivers] all were." Obtaining permission to send ambulances to the front marked a change in the role of the ambulance service at the hospital in 1915.

As a result, the hospital's own transportation squad, the so-called "Paris service," on the one hand, and the sections now led by Andrew, the "field service," on the other,

22Gloucester Daily Times, 1 August 1984.
23Andrew to his parents, 4 April 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 77.
24Andrew to his parents, 14 April 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 89. Abbé Félix Klein at the American Ambulance Hospital confided to his diary that "Our brave friends have obtained authority to go to the Front, even under fire, to glean their bloody harvest." Abbé Félix Klein, Diary of a French Army Chaplain (London: Andrew Melrose Ltd., n.d.), 164.
each went separate ways. Within the hospital, these services earned distinct reputations. Any driver’s "soul rejoices much more when his turn comes for transportation between the field of battle and the hospital near the front. The danger," observed Abbé Klein of the American Ambulance Hospital, "adds a charm to that of the service alone."25 And Andrew wrote to his parents on the day he learned that his sections could serve directly at the front that this "was one of the happiest, most interesting, most beautiful days that I have ever spent."26 Thus by June, Andrew had opened up the possibility for a unique service for Americans eager to join the European theatre close to the firing line. Other ambulance services would eventually work directly behind the trenches with their ambulance squads, including Richard Norton’s corps.

While Andrew developed the central idea around which the field service of the American Ambulance Hospital was henceforth to evolve, the ambulancier also reconsidered his political ideas about the meaning of the war. Initially, it seems, the idle bachelor had engaged in the dangerous and heroic work to certify his social status within his own community. In the United States, his career had come to a halt; in France, his sacrifice for humanity ratified his altruistic service and corroborated his claim to belong to an elite able to undertake such leisurely adventures. Even though he had studied in both France and Germany, his advocacy of French culture in the Cercle Français at Harvard had earned him the title of "Officier d'Académie" by the minister of public instruction in France.27 Thus, Andrew blended his aspiration for meaningful action with his long-standing regard for the French.

In the spring and summer of 1915, the aspect of personal sacrifice, while still visible in Andrew’s letters to his parents, had acquired a new quality of political dedication. Indeed, Andrew joined the pro-Allied cause with vigor. He had seen the German atrocities, he now pointed out, and his letters to the Boston Herald told a New England audience about the unassuming French dedication to crush the evil monarchy. Culture and democracy, Andrew argued, connected the United States and France. And, come to think of it, it had connected the two republics ever since Lafayette fought for American independence.

After April 1915, Andrew’s thinking turned from his individual perspective to a consideration of how this war should be understood from a larger, American, point of view. In France he sensed both the background for an American renovation of ideals as he understood them, and the cleansing aspect of war itself for individuals and society at large. To Andrew, the war became a clear cut issue of "right and wrong," of France and "civilization" against Germany and "Kultur." "The French people are appreciative," Andrew argued. Here was an ideal background for American innovation, sacrifice, and heroism.28 At the same time, his own country missed a crucial opportunity to engage in a sacred mission for humanity. With Woodrow Wilson, Andrew shared a sense of his own

25Klein, Diary, 243-44.
26Andrew to his parents, 14 April 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 89.
28Andrew to his parents, 18 January 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 27.
country as a city upon a hill. With the Theodore Roosevelt of 1916, however, Andrew shared a longing for intervention. "Never again shall we have so vast a chance to help in making right prevail," Andrew wrote.

> It is for America, the one great disinterested judge among the nations of the world, to speak firmly for the sanctity of contracts between nations, and for the rights of small and unoffending countries to ‘life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’

Andrew situated the United States in the context of the European War. Aloof and innocent, he pictured his country naturally superior among the Allies combating the "Germano-Turkish powers." The American people "who are rich and strong and safe," he pointed out after the sinking of the Lusitania, were destined to engage in a struggle for American ideals he considered valid well beyond American borders.

While the ideological underpinning of the Field Service was shaped by Andrew’s dedication to France, both Bacon and Andrew shared political ideas peculiar to a conservative Eastern Republicanism. Andrew joined Bacon (and Theodore Roosevelt) when he asked in his letter to the editor of the Boston Herald whether America was "no longer a country of ideals beyond success in business and the accumulation of material wealth and comfort?" With Andrew at its helm, the Field Service represented ideas about Europe and the war reflective of its East Coast heritage. In accord with these ideals, Andrew turned the motor ambulance section of the American Ambulance Hospital into an organization that combined both: it provided a framework for American individuals seeking sacrifice in dangerous work along the front; and it did its part in the pro-war machine at home.

**The "Ready Lifter, Helper, Healer"**

The most fluent spokesman for the values of ambulancing was certainly Henry James, whom Richard Norton had enlisted as chairman for his American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps. James represented a group Henry F. May has called "custodians of culture" who tied to the Allied cause their own patrician ideas of cultural stability, progress, and morality. How "can one . . . not feel that the Allies are fighting to the death for the soul and the purpose and the future that are in us, for the defense of every ideal that has most guided our growth and that most assures our unity?" James asked the read-

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29 Andrew to his parents, 23 June 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 141.
30 Andrew to his parents, 8 May 1915, Ibid., 109.
31 Boston Herald, 3 June 1915.
32 Donations during the years of operations of Andrew’s organization stemmed mainly from New York State (more than three hundred cars), Massachusetts (over one hundred cars), followed by Pennsylvania and Illinois (about seventy cars). See American Field Service, History, 3:525-51.
33 May, End of American Innocence. 35. May refers to Richard Norton’s father, Charles Eliot Norton, as among the best examples of that type.
ers of the New York Times in an interview about Richard Norton’s ambulance work.\textsuperscript{34} While the novelistic pointed to the achievements of his protégé, his discussion of steering ambulance cars along the French front was equally valid for Andrew’s corps. To the American public, the differences between the corps were quite unclear anyway.\textsuperscript{35}

In the absence of American intervention, Richard Norton’s engagement in France made him James’ hero: The professor lived up to the poet’s expectation of a cultural elite, heroically volunteering to face the danger of the firing zone in defense of the ideals of civilization. The cultural ideals advocated by James, and shared by Norton and Andrew, tied nineteenth-century values of a conservative liberalism to concepts of cultural stewardship and personal sacrifice, then linked all three to the Allied cause. “It’s impossible for me to overstate my impression of his intelligent force, his energy and lucidity, his gallantry and resolution,” James wrote to Norton’s aunt about her nephew.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, the ideal volunteer in both Andrew’s and Norton’s corps was best described in James’ words, and style. The perfect ambulancier brought to his task "educated intelligence" and a cultivated tradition of tact, and I may perhaps be allowed to confess that, for myself, I find a positive added beauty in the fact that the unpaid chauffeur, the wise amateur driver and ready lifter, helper, healer, and, so far as may be, consoler, is apt to be an University man and acquainted with other pursuits.\textsuperscript{37}

To American patricians both at home and in Europe, gentlemen chauffeurs, steering their ambulances to the front, worked not merely in the name of humanity; rather, both Andrew and Norton perceived their knights-errant to rescue the cultural ideals of their patrician heritage. The shellfire along the European front provided the testing ground for the ideals of an American elite and its ideology of liberal conservatism. Both Andrew’s and Norton’s recruiting efforts in the United States reflected these ideas.

In the beginning of the war, one "merely climbed up on an ambulance, and it was yours."\textsuperscript{38} These adventurous days, however, during which Norton and Andrew themselves had first taken hold of steering wheels in France, soon changed. Both Andrew’s American Ambulance Field Service and Norton’s American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps began actively to recruit drivers in the United States for their services. They provided the infrastructure for young men eager for their own "baptism of fire" in France. Both organizations, in keeping with the idea advocated by Henry James, aimed to recruit an elite of "gentlemen." Neither Norton nor Andrew shared the assumptions of those advocating Universal Military Training at home. The "right kind of volunteer chauffeurs," A. Piatt Andrew agreed with the hospital’s president Robert Bacon, should not be representatives of American society in general, but of a rather exclusive group of...

\textsuperscript{34}New York Times, 21 March 1915, sec. 5, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{35}See discussion of public relations below.
men.39

To send "well-bred" college students to the front in the initial trial section of April 1915 did not merely serve to impress the French. As part of an agreement with the French authorities, it evolved into a recruiting policy which stressed the educational, religious, and adventurous experience of steering a "flivver" [Model-T Ford] with exposure to shell fire.40 "Volunteers must be native born American citizens, between 21 and 35 years old," an AAFS flyer told prospective applicants. "They must be able to refer to six persons of standing, such as physicians, lawyers, clergymen, bankers and professors, who will vouch for their American citizenship, their reliability, sobriety, industry and amenability to discipline."41 Drivers for the Norton corps, preferably of the "gentleman-clubman type," had to pay their way to New York City and on to Paris.42 They were also required to provide funds for expenses while at the front or on leave.43 Added to this were the cost for the uniform and personal equipment such as blankets and helmet. Clearly, this was an undertaking for those who could afford it. The AAFS, too, usually required candidates to pay for traveling expenses and equipment. This was essential, Sleeper argued, "if the volunteer spirit were to be kept alive."44 The AAFS, however, provided board and lodging while men were on leave in Paris, and paid an allowance of two francs per day. Also, the AAFS occasionally sponsored volunteers who could not afford transatlantic passage.45

Thus, no medical skills were needed to become a heroic volunteer in France. Driving ambulances was about speed, not treatment, Andrew argued.46 Also, ambulanceing was to be for men only. While women drove automobiles for other relief organizations, the AAFS and the Norton-Harjes sections never allowed women among their ranks.47

In order to find gentlemanly personnel, Andrew wrote directly to American col-

39Scott, Bacon: Life and Letters, 210-11.

40For the agreement with the French army regarding "Le Recrutement du Personnel des Ambulances Americaines," see document attached to letter by Frank Mason, TL, 28 April 1915, Box 16 N 2787, D.S.A.: Organisation Correspondence 1915, Archives de l’Armée de Terre, Vincennes, France. Drivers were to be students of the "grande université Américaines." Harvard and Yale were specifically mentioned.


44American Field Service, History, 1:43.

45The AAFS aided some drivers financially. See, for example, Henry Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 17 February 1917, Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives. Also see Eliot Norton to Richard Norton, 29 February 1916, Box 4, Richard Norton Papers. When men were of short supply, the AAFS’s policy of providing at least some financial help seemed to work to the organization’s advantage. In this letter, Eliot Norton complained that two men, Paul Tison and Walter Wheeler, had abandoned the Norton corps for the AAFS in connection with this issue. (As a general note, I have included abbreviations spelling out what type of document or manuscript I am quoting from whenever possible. Sometimes, however, as is the case with the above letter by Eliot Norton, I have been unable to supply that information.)


47Le bien-être du Blessé Woman’s Motor Unit of the New York Women’s City Club, for example, consisted of women only and carried food and other relief items. Le bien-être du Blessé Woman’s Motor Unit, Report: December 1917 to December 1919 (New York: Le bien-être du Blessé Woman’s Motor Unit, [ca. 1920]).
leges. Why does not the University of Virginia buy an ambulance, Andrew asked a college friend, which would bear the school’s inscription "just as the cars of Harvard, Dartmouth and the other universities do?" Andrew played on the competition among colleges, referring to the number of drivers each facility had sent to the front. "Do Your Part in the War[,] Maintain Harvard’s Record" read one sign to students in Cambridge. "The American Field Service has recently been described by a member of General Joffre’s staff as 'The finest flower of the magnificent wreath offered by the Great America to her little Latin sister," Andrew wrote to college magazines such as the Princeton Alumni Weekly. "There are surely many more of the sterling youths of America who would like to add their little to that wreath." For the purpose of recruiting drivers, the AAFS set up committees at thirty-three universities, supported by the staff and, usually, the university president. Even when Andrew cabled for mechanics, he cabled to the New York office that "Gentlemanly personality [is] essential."

On the other side of the Atlantic, educators, too, perceived the value of dangerous ambulance work at the front. In January 1915, the committee in charge of the American Ambulance Hospital in Neuilly and of Andrew’s field service received mail from Wellesley and Dartmouth College. Both colleges wished to donate autos. Dartmouth, furthermore, was also eager to send the men to staff these cars.

Unlike their rivals at such schools as the University of Wisconsin, many teachers at Ivy League colleges favored a character-shaping "Liberal Education" for their students. Professors such as Josiah Royce and Charles Copeland at Harvard as well as Charles Mills Gayley at Berkeley still considered their task the training of a "democratic nobility" of "gentlemen." These men were not hostile to democratic ideals, yet they considered themselves to be the democracy’s natural leaders, and their students their heirs. As Theodore Roosevelt explained in his book The Strenuous Life, these men’s social status was verified by their voluntary service. Andrew's and Norton's educational ideas corresponded with these concepts. In France, young ambulance drivers participated in an experience of initiation, these men reasoned. "Between the lines of the letters," Cornell University president Martin W. Sampson wrote about letters home from volunteers in Andrew’s corps, "may be clearly read a heartening

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48 Andrew to Robert Gooch, TL, 2 January 1915 [1916?], Box 6A, Folder 69A, AFS Archives.
50 Andrew, "To the Editor," TLS, Box 5, Folder 64, AFS Archives.
51 American Field Service, History, 1:44.
52 Andrew to "Ambulance New York," cable, 19 February 1916, Box 6A, Folder 69A, AFS Archives.
53 For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see James Thomas Lapsley III, "Gentlemen Volunteers: American Ambulance Drivers in the First World War" (M.A. Thesis, University of California, Davis, 1971).
55 See Lapsley, "Gentlemen Volunteers."
3. Chart of ambulance work at the front. Whenever possible, motor ambulances would fetch wounded directly from the regimental first-aid shelters, but more commonly from the dressing stations (Postes de Secours). Ambulances then carried the wounded to the Postes de Triage (a mobile hospital unit), and on to hospitals in the rear. Reprinted from American Field Service, History, 1:28:
4. AAFS volunteers help loading a wounded soldier into an ambulance car. Reprinted from American Field Service, History, 1:133.

7. Section 4 (see section flag in center) of the American Ambulance Field Service about to leave for the front in 1915. Reprinted, with permission, from the William L Foley Collection of the American Volunteer Ambulance Drivers, 1914-1918.
thing--the growth of high-spirited natures out of boyhood to a man’s stature."56 Andrew
and Norton, too, had brought these ideas with them. Once they had established them-
selves as leaders of their respective ambulance organizations, they provided the facility
which could bring others to the firing line. "No one can pass through such an experience
unchanged," the Inspector-General told the readers of The Outlook. "With our men it has
been a strengthening, a refining, a democratizing, a spiritualizing process."57 Many Ivy
League college presidents advocated military training to harden the "moral character" of
their students "who were growing soft and lazy from the destructive effects of luxury and
self-indulgence."58 Andrew, too, used the concept of "character" as a foil for selecting
volunteers. The Inspector-General pointed out to his friend Henry Sleeper that in finan-
cially sponsoring applicants, "their character and ideals" should be considered first.59

As Henry James had explained, and as Theodore Roosevelt knew, both Andrew’s
and Norton’s own work under the motto of "noblesse oblige" at once confirmed their so-
cial position, and made them representatives of particular educational ideas at home. The
dangerous work of steering ambulances under shellfire along the front, the core idea of
Andrew’s organization, furnished the champions of a "Liberal Culture" with the means to
support their students' test of courage and manhood. To have experienced danger close to
the firing line was to be the initiating test of one’s inner composition, the challenge to the
individual’s strength. When Andrew himself returned to Dunkirk and his old section for a
visit, he remarked that "the whole experience was like going back to college after gradua-
tion."60

Between 1914 and 1917, the period of activity of the American Ambulance Field
Service as a private organization, most ambulance volunteers were college men: 1833 out
of 2328 volunteers for the AAFS came from American colleges and universities.61 Most
of them had attended Ivy League colleges, such as Harvard (325), Yale (187), and Prince-
ton (181).62 The official history of the AAFS would later describe its members as "gradu-
ates or students of American colleges and universities. . . . Some of them had been busi-
ness men, lawyers, and doctors; some had been teachers; and some even had been clerg-
ymen."63 The AAFS, in its own perception, catered to a patrician elite reared in Ivy
League colleges. And Richard Norton’s work, too, meant to provide access to gentle-
manly service to a select few.

Much of the preparedness discussion in the United States focused on discipline as
part of the individual’s service. The military training camps, which had been organized
by Leonard Wood since 1913, hoped to provide social integration and training to those

56American Field Service, Camion Letters from American College Men (New York: Henry Holt &
Co., 1918), xii.
57A. Piatt Andrew, "For Love of France," The Outlook 114 (27 December 1916), 930.
58Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of
59Andrew to Sleeper, TL, 23 February 1917, Box 7, Folder 72, AFS Archives.
60Andrew to his parents, 11 March 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 55.
62Ibid., 3:440.
63Ibid., 1:7.
volunteers who spent their summers marching through the forests of New York State.\textsuperscript{64} Asked for the principal value of American participation in the war, war correspondent Frederick Palmer told the New York Times that a "knowledge and respect for discipline and organization" were on top of his list.\textsuperscript{65} The ambulance services, in the perception of those who had broader social purposes for an American intervention in mind, was the vanguard of organizations providing self-control and obedience.

In France, however, this vanguard of volunteers had escaped minute supervision. There was no drill of a Plattsburg kind, and none of the constraining social control that an enlisted soldier would experience. Volunteers lined up in formal situations, for a visiting French official, for example. Yet there is no evidence that this was part of a system of strict military drill. Ivy League volunteers perceived of themselves as an elite volunteering on the firing line, not as a social group which longed for military training as a leveling force. They had volunteered to go to France, after all, and paid their way into this adventure. These ambulanciers preferred driving ambulances in France and real action to being "marooned in some Cape Cod volunteer camp," as one AAFS official put it.\textsuperscript{66}

Andrew had told the first section to join the French army at the front that on them relied the existence of the field ambulance service. When French authorities first considered permission for American volunteer ambulance drivers to be attached directly to the armies in the field, they told the hospital board in Neuilly that they would "prefer cars without men" if the "high standard" of men was not kept up.\textsuperscript{67} Quite unlike the common soldier, Andrew hoped that his volunteers would understand that it required an effort to preserve this unique possibility to work for the French. "We have no military control over the men in the sense that we cannot lock them up when they misbehave," the Inspector-General wrote Henry Sleeper, "There is only one kind of punishment and that is dismissal."\textsuperscript{68} In the absence of punishment available to the military, Andrew’s private organization appealed to the driver’s sense of responsibility. "We have been given as foreigners and representatives of an officially neutral country extraordinary privileges," Andrew wrote to a driver, "... and we must see to it that these privileges and this confidence are justified."\textsuperscript{69}

AAFS sections usually contained twenty-five to forty American drivers and five to seven French personnel (both as liaisons to the French army and as cooks and handymen). One driver became Commandant-Adjoint, responsible for the enforcement of orders and discipline. Only one French officer was assigned, and the American lieutenant, a volunteer himself, "set up, as a rule, few barriers between himself and his men. There

\textsuperscript{64}For a detailed account of the Plattsburg movement, see John Garry Clifford, \textit{The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920} (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1972).


\textsuperscript{66}[Sleeper] to Andrew, TL, 17 February 1917, Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives.


\textsuperscript{68}Andrew to Sleeper, TL, 8 March 1917, Box 7, Folder 72, AFS Archives.

\textsuperscript{69}Andrew to Mr. R. Maclay, TL, 21 July 1915, Box 3, Folder 30, AFS Archives.
was no need," a former driver remembered, "when he was worth his salt."70

Inspector-General Andrew toured the sections frequently, but these inspections remained brief. "A short chat with the leader . . . , a brief inspection of the tents, a look around the place where the ambulances were parked, and we were off for Verdun," Mrs. W. K. Vanderbilt, wife of the wealthy industrialist and a sponsor of the field service, observed on a trip to the front with Andrew.71 Andrew was aware of this leisurely discipline. The sections "were more like large families than military formations," Andrew remembered.72 The boys, he wrote home, were "living roughly as they might in a summer camp."73 As long as his ambulanciers showed eagerness to work, Andrew left the men to themselves. He frequently asked French authorities to assign certain sections to busier parts of the front in order to keep the boys busy and out of trouble.

To challenge the Ivy Leaguish club-atmosphere of the service was to challenge the Inspector-General himself. In May 1917, one Mr. Amy, ex-settlement worker from Hale House in Boston, was assigned by Andrew to take care of discipline matters in the quickly growing ambulance service. "I am sorry to say," Andrew wrote in anger, "that though we have made every effort to give him a chance to fit in, he is temperamentally impossible." The social worker "makes no apparent effort to win them [the ambulance volunteers], but treats them as he probably treated the little Jew boys of South Boston in slum settlements. . . . In plain Language [sic], I think he is a damned fool and I think he better go back to Hale house and the Jew boys of South Boston."74

What Amy had done wrong was to fail to "win the men rather than command them," a task Andrew felt particularly strongly about. Andrew’s dislike of social domination went along with his own understanding of being the leader among equals. Amy had violated the organization’s tacit understanding of elitism and exclusivity by subordinating men of equal social status to his ideas of discipline. Discipline was not to challenge the "esprit de corps" of the Field Service. In the Inspector’s view, only outright misbehavior by an ambulance driver deserved punishment. In severe cases, punishment meant dismissal. Otherwise, drivers were turned over to the less gratifying Paris service. (Driving ambulances within Paris only, volunteers thus lost the privilege of serving along the front.75)

The effect of this policy was an occasional absence of hierarchical thinking when this thinking seemed necessary. "It is more difficult than anyone away from here can imagine to keep contented all of the different officers, . . . most of whom feel that they ought really to be entrusted, or at any rate consulted, about the management not merely of

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70Jefferson B. Fletcher, "In the Ambulance Service," Harvard Graduates’ Magazine 28 (September 1919), 28.
72American Field Service, History, 1:25.
73Andrew to his parents, 31 July 1915, Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, 168-69.
74Andrew to Sleeper, TLS, 10 May 1917, box 7, folder 73, AFS Archives.
75When a driver tried to climb the fence of the Eiffel Tower on his first night in Paris, Andrew told him that "it would have served him right if he had been shot. . . . I promptly turned him over to the Paris Service where he perhaps belongs." Andrew to Sleeper, TLS, 30 January 1917, Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives.
a part of the service, but of the whole."76 By relying on sections to regulate themselves, Andrew created a sometimes paradoxical situation. With eagerness the Inspector-General sought to retain a sense of community and common purpose, enclosed by the exclusiveness of the organization’s mission and the social status of its volunteers.

Andrew’s and Norton’s ambulance work had many things in common: they both engaged in dangerous work at the front; both adhered to similar cultural ideals in their dedication to the Allied cause (Andrew, to be sure, employed a stronger pro-French rhetoric); both ambulanciers, furthermore, preferably employed men of the "gentleman-type" in their services. But the two rivals employed slightly different motivations in their work. After the initial sections had been put out in 1915, Andrew turned the field service of the American Ambulance Hospital into an educational organization serving Ivy League colleges in the United States. Norton, on the other hand, understood his work to be for him and his type: mature men of a cultured social heritage and well-equipped financial background. Even though he, too, would employ men of college age Norton held to a (however subtly) different ideal of the right kind of volunteer.

Unlike Andrew, who toured his sections along the front, Norton remained with his original section most of the time and did not engage in frequent visits of other sections. The archeologist-turned-ambulancecier sought to retain the initial daredevil atmosphere rather than turn his organization into an outlet for adolescent and immature college students. He disregarded plans for organizational growth which might have brought more men to the firing line. Norton’s men, accordingly, remembered him not as an educator, but "more like an elder brother than a commanding officer."77 Unlike Andrew, who increasingly appeared to his drivers as a removed official chauffeured along the front in a convertible, Norton considered his service as an individual task for him and his friends. "I don’t want you to send out volunteers who are too young," Richard wrote to his brother Eliot Norton, his representative in the United States. "What this work chiefly demands is resource. Our men . . . are generally dependent on their own intelligence for the conduct of their work," he argued with an eye on Andrew’s adolescent ambulanciers.78 "You see, there is not much in that kind of life but plain, hard, uncomfortable work," he pointed out.

So anyone, who thinks he is coming out here to wander over the stricken field doing the Sir Philip Sidney act to friend and foe alike, protected from harm by the mystical lift of heroism playing about his hyacinthine locks, had better stay home.79

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76 Andrew to Sleeper, TL, 24 August 1916, Box 2, Folder 24, AFS Archives.
This was a man’s job, not a campground for "sterling youths."

Yet even Richard Norton had to compromise. He expected volunteers of a stronger financial background than the AAFS because Norton did not pay for expenses in France. In the light of this added financial burden, some of Norton’s prospective volunteers left for the AAFS.80 Not always could he find volunteers who paid all expenses, brought their own cars, converted them into ambulances, and kept their own chauffeurs with them in their heroic work on the front. Those volunteers, as one staff member put it, "make for economy."81 But as these kinds of volunteers were not always forthcoming, Richard Norton, too, would put up with younger drivers.

Because most men came from a particular social group in the United States, the "esprit de corps" of both the AAFS and Norton’s organization, however, resembled that of a gentlemen’s club at home. Ambulance volunteers kept up the competition traditional among Ivy League colleges. One AAFS section, for example, was known as the "Harvard Club" due to the number of Harvard students steering its Fords.82 Also, drivers found a different frame of reference for their fraternal competition by engaging in the newly created Paris baseball league. The Paris service of the American Ambulance Hospital, as well as Andrew’s field service and Norton’s section participated in games whenever their schedule of work and leisure would allow for it. The Parisian edition of the New York Herald kept the American community informed about rankings and scores.

The baseball league reflected the college atmosphere attached to the ambulance services operating out of Paris. As most volunteers brought the ideas of a college generation and the funds of those attending its most expensive schools, the leisurely ways of volunteers sometimes challenged the ideals of "hard and strenuous life" behind the trenches which their professors at home appreciated. The New York Times observed, for example, that Norton’s baseball team appeared for a baseball match "in true college fashion, crowded into a Rolls-Royce ambulance, singing American songs."83 Also, since many a driver’s family provided the funds (and sometimes even the ambulance car) for their son’s adventure on the French front, even Andrew was occasionally appalled by the effect. In one such case of abundant funds without compensating eagerness for strenuous work, Andrew discovered a driver staying at the Ritz Hotel in Paris. "I told him that if he did not show more interest in his work we would have to discharge him," he wrote to Sleeper.84 In this way, the Inspector-General maneuvered between an "esprit de corps," which he cherished, and attempts to check extravagant behavior by his volunteers.

At the same time, Andrew focused his efforts on the overall growth of the field service attached to the American Ambulance Hospital. Within the hospital, he continuously sought to increase the number of volunteers and cars employed. Unlike Richard Norton, the one-time driver increasingly appeared as an administrator and manager of an educational institution, acknowledging organizational growth not only as the supplier of

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82 American Field Service, Friends of France, 43.
84 Andrew to Sleeper, TLS, 12 February 1917, Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives.
both success and personal power, but also as the most effective aid to France. He no longer participated in the muddy work of his ambulance drivers he regarded as bountiful. Rather, he preferred managerial success to sacrifice on the front. The Inspector-General relished his role as leader among Ivy League students and among equals of an educated American elite. At the same time, however, in his work for the French cause, he adhered to ideas he had brought from his experience as manager and administrator before the war.

**Progressive Conservatism**

Shortly after he had taken command of the field service of the American Ambulance Hospital, Andrew clashed with its authorities in numerous ways. After the outbreak of hostilities, the hospital’s siren call for volunteers had unified the American community under the leadership of Ambassador Myron T. Herrick. The hospital soon provided accommodations for four hundred patients and specialized in severe cases. Just like the field service, the hospital also recruited its staff from American colleges. In Neuilly, American volunteer surgeons and physicians could display their skill. Soon, however, volunteers eager to set their own pace would begin to establish separate American organizations in France.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the war, the American Ambulance Hospital claimed leadership for American relief activity in Paris. In the absence of large organizations such as the American Red Cross (which, until 1917, remained a relatively small organization), the semi-aristocratic elite around American Ambassador Myron T. Herrick and the hospital’s president Robert Bacon set the tone for relief work. From "the beginning of the war, the principle of unanimity was adopted by the administration of the Ambulance [hospital]. Names of those active in its administration have been withheld," one reader explained in the New York Times.

85Technically, the American Ambulance Hospital located in the Lycée Pasteur in Neuilly was a temporary subsidiary of the American Hospital operating for the duration of the war only. Thus the committee in charge of the American Ambulance Hospital reported to the Board of Governors of its much smaller parent institution, the American Hospital. The Transportation Committee in charge of the automobile ambulance services reported to the American Ambulance Hospital Committee and not to the Board of Governors of the American Hospital.

86See letter by Francis T. Colby, who organized a separate auto ambulance unit in early 1915, to Eliot Norton, 3 November 1914, Box 11, Richard Norton Papers. See also his letter to Robert W. Bliss, ALS, [ca. 1 February 1915], Robert Woods Bliss Papers, Widener Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. "My own contract with the American Hospital has expired," Colby wrote. "Shall keep [on] as part of their organization only so long as they treat me with reasonable decency." For Colby, also see the "Minutes of the Ambulance Committee Meetings of The American Hospital of Paris, Commencing Aug. 2, 1914 and ending Dec. 30, 1915, incl." Minutes for meeting on 23 September 1914, in Archives of American Hospital of Paris. Furthermore, the Franco-American Flying Corps got underway with the help of Dr. Edmund Gros, chief surgeon of the American Ambulance Field Service. In December 1915, Herman H. Harjes, who had been member of the ambulance committee, planned a ski ambulance corps. New York Times, 25 December 1915, sec. 2, p. 2. Harjes also organized his own ambulance organization ("Formation Harjes"), which merged with Norton’s in 1916.

Even though the idea of a transportation service had been born by doctors related to the hospital, the ambulance service was soon eyed critically by those in charge of the American Ambulance Hospital. While Andrew’s field service smacked of adolescent leisure and adventure, for example, doctors and administrators running the hospital appreciated control and supervision. Arthur W. Kipling, who was in charge of the Paris ambulance service at the American Ambulance Hospital, had instituted "rigid drills" for his ambulanciers, who practiced "marching with the stretcher."

When Herman H. Harjes resigned from his post as treasurer of the American Ambulance Hospital, he attacked the ambulanciers by telling the press that "the automobile squad paid more attention to the cut of their uniforms and chevrons on the sleeves than to the serious business of carrying the wounded." In this atmosphere, Andrew was put on the defensive. His field service had been growing since April 1915. In addition to Section 1, where Andrew himself was assigned upon arrival in Neuilly, the hospital’s field service put out Section 2 and 3 in April 1915. Sections 4 and 5 left Neuilly in November 1915 and May 1916. Now Andrew had to ensure that the hospital’s field service was not growing out of proportion. Shortly after the first new section had joined the French army at the front in April 1915, he assured the American Ambulance Hospital authorities in his Inspection Report that "The systematic organisation of their service, the discipline of the men are perfect." He added that the "story that one of the men became intoxicated and undressed in a public place was true, but the offender was one of the French doctors."

Furthermore, the costs of the field service added to the tense relationship between Andrew and the hospital committee. The transportation sections, after all, used funds raised in the United States under the hospital’s name. Also, how could the field service be defined as part of the American Ambulance Hospital if the number of wounded transported by it far exceeded the Paris service, which brought wounded to the hospital itself?

Laurence V. Benét, who was a member of the American Ambulance Hospital committee and chairman of its transportation committee, conceded on a visit to the United States that the field service "increases the expense, but it is greatly needed." But hospital president Robert Bacon critically observed that "we are beginning to try to do just a little more than could be well done[,] especially in the transportation service."

However, it was the great popularity of the field service which soon turned Andrew’s corps into an internal rival to the hospital’s own operation. When the New York

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88 *New York Times*, 20 December 1914, sec. 2, p. 3. "This is effected by the man in front starting with his right foot while the man behind starts with his left," the paper explained.
91 Andrew, "Inspection Report," TMS, 19 July 1915, Box 17, Folder 146, AFS Archives.
92 In May 1915, the Paris service carried 932 wounded, while all the field service sections combined carried 10,505. Dr. J. William White in *The Survey* (18 September 1915), 563. At the end of August 1915, ninety-one cars operated in the field. Fifteen ambulance cars were attached to the American Ambulance Hospital in Neuilly-sur-Seine. The American Ambulance Hospital in Paris, *Annual Report 1915* (New York: American Ambulance Hospital, n.d.), 23.
Herald (Paris) ran an article on the American Ambulance Hospital in September 1915, discussion of the achievements of the field service took place in one and a half out of two columns.95 "I hear that the Bacons feel that the Field Service is taking much attention from the Hospital," Sleeper would later write to Andrew.96 To many Americans, the transportation service at the front under enemy fire had a more urgent appeal than peaceful treatment of wounded in a Parisian suburb.

In this hostile atmosphere within the hospital, the Paris service and field service operated in competition for funds.97 Andrew aimed at a larger field service, yet this did not seem possible within the financial confines of the hospital's operation. Thus, in the fall of 1915, Andrew decided to raise funds for his field service independently from the hospital. To this end, he installed his friend Henry Sleeper as a fund-raiser in the United States.

Sleeper, a bachelor himself, was Andrew’s neighbor on Eastern Point in Gloucester, Massachusetts. The interior designer had erected his house, "Beauport," on Eastern Point and moved there in 1907, about a year after he had meet Andrew. From then on, both men had exchanged letters frequently.98 Much as Mrs. Bacon headed a committee to raise funds for the hospital directed by her husband, Sleeper now created a field service fund which directly aided Andrew’s ambulance operations. "I have collected this additional fund in order that the Field Service at the front might be more liberally provided for," Sleeper explained to the hospital officials in a letter officially addressed to Andrew.99 As long as Andrew’s efforts added to the overall budget of the hospital, those in charge of it did not mind. "The Field Transportation Service," one fundraising brochure pointed out, "does not burden the cost of the hospital . . . as it is supported by funds specifically raised for that purpose."100

At the same time, however, the hospital’s board disregarded Andrew’s plans for an enlarged service and independent financial resources. The Inspector-General complained to a volunteer that the Paris service used money "which we collect for the field service."101 And he wrote to Robert Bacon that the hospital’s representative in New York did not turn over funds raised by Sleeper.102 Thus, in early 1916, Andrew finally sought to detach the field service from the hospital altogether.

Yet Bacon remained an obstacle to the institutional independence Andrew sought. When the Inspector-General proposed such a scheme, the hospital’s president replied that

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95 New York Herald (Paris), 10 September 1915.
96 Sleeper to Andrew, 9 December 1916, Box 7, Folder 70, AFS Archives.
97 See A. Piatt Andrew, "Memorandum Concerning Field Service Maintenance Funds," TDS, 19 December 1915, Box 60, Folder 589, AFS Archives.
98 See Hayden and Gray, Beauport Chronicle.
99 Henry Sleeper to Andrew, TLS, 11 November 1915, Box 7, Folder 70, AFS Archives. The language of the letter clearly indicates that it was written in order to be presented to the board of the hospital.
100 "Stuyvesant Engineering Company Printed Pamphlet" (n.p., 1915), at Hoover Institute, Stanford, California.
101 Andrew to Ed Salisbury, TL, 19 June 1916, Box 8, Folder 91, AFS Archives.
102 Andrew to Bacon, TL, 29 June 1916, Rare Documents Binder #2, AFS Archives.
a separation would be a "fatal mistake." Such a separation, Bacon reasoned, would cut into the image of Americans in Paris uniting for the Allied cause and into the image of his leadership of Americans in France unifying for the Allied cause.

Despite these reservations by Bacon, however, the field service managed to gain independence from direct control of the American Ambulance Hospital committee in July 1916. Henceforth, the AAFS was installed not in an out building on the grounds of the hospital in Neuilly, but in a villa in Paris furnished for the duration of the war. The AAFS now had its own treasurer and Sleeper as official representative in Boston. "Our offices are now located in a fine old eighteenth century house in the rue Raynouard, with acres of gardens about them, with large dormitory, refectory and living rooms for the men going out to the front and the men coming back in permission," Andrew proudly wrote to a driver. "[T]here is a sign on the front of the house bearing the words 'American Ambulance Field Service' with the flags of the United States and France crossed above. Here is where you belong." "21 rue Raynouard" became the club house for Andrew's ambulance drivers and the symbol for its fraternal exclusiveness.

To be sure, Andrew was unable to sever completely the ties of the AAFS to its parent institution. His field service would henceforth not report to the transportation committee of the American Ambulance Hospital. Instead, Andrew reported directly to the Board of Governors of the American Hospital. Also, as honorary treasurer of Andrew's organization, Robert Bacon was still the head of the field service while Andrew directed the ambulance service in its day-to-day operations. "Technically the Field Service depends upon the old American Hospital [not the American Ambulance Hospital, which was attached to it], but the direction of the Field Service is practically in the hands of Dr. Gros, Galatti, and myself," Andrew explained. Furthermore, the separation had been made possible by the influence of an old supporter of the hospital, Mrs. W. K. Vanderbilt. Indeed, his organization, too, would be closely tied to the social and political groups and motivations which supported the hospital in Neuilly. It never occurred to Andrew to question the social and political ideas of the hospital's leadership. What Andrew criticized instead was what he perceived as a lack of efficiency and mismanagement at the hospital. Patients were kept in the hospital, he wrote to Sleeper, long after they had recovered "in order to make a proper record and keep the per diem expense and the death rate down. . . . Mr. Bacon ought to be ashamed to allow these things to go on." By the time his organization moved out from under the hospital and set up its own quarters in

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103Bacon to Andrew, cable, n.d., Rare Documents Binder #2, AFS Archives. Bacon was president of the Board of Governors of the American Hospital of Paris, chairman of its American Committee, and member of the committee directing the affairs of its subsidiary, the American Ambulance Hospital, to which Inspector-General Andrew reported.

104American Field Service, History, 1:64.

105Andrew to Charles Freeborn, Esq., TL, 30 August 1916, Rare Documents Binder #2, AFS Archives.

106Ibid.

107For details of the separation, see "Minutes of the Board of Governors of the American Hospital of Paris from January 15th 1906 to February 14th 1917," Meeting of 12 July 1916, in Archives of American Hospital of Paris.

108Andrew to Sleeper, TLS, 24 July 1916, Box 7, Folder 70, AFS Archives.
Paris, Andrew’s regard for efficiency left him utterly disgusted with the hospital's leadership.

Even before the war, Andrew had been in many respects a strange match to established Boston society. He had entered it by way of Lawrenceville, Princeton, and Harvard. He was not from a well-established Boston family, but from an Indiana town. Now, in the summer of 1916, Andrew again emerged as an awkward member of the established American elite organizing relief work in France. As a politician-turned-ambulancier, Andrew probably appreciated the media visibility of his organization. While Herrick and Bacon continued to call for systematization of war relief, Andrew would remain unwilling to heed such calls until the American declaration of the war and the arrival of the American military in France a year later.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, Andrew’s AAFS did its share in preparing its own country for the Allied cause. As the campaign for preparedness picked up in the United States, the AAFS, too, became as busy as never before.¹¹⁰ In August 1916, one and a half years after Andrew could first send sections to the front, the field service employed six sections. The AAFS now comprised about "200 young men of the same education and ideas at a time when there seemed little hope that their countrymen would take up the cause they had made their own."¹¹¹ In the fall of 1916, Andrew felt proud of his achievement of conducting the largest volunteer ambulance organization with the French Army. The banking world to which he could relate so well, furthermore, had just presented him with a gift of $30,000 for a complete section.¹¹² In December 1916, the so-called New York Stock Exchange Section left the Paris headquarters in December for its "baptism" on the front in Salonika, Greece. Andrew explained to the readers of The Outlook that he was in the "business of saving wounded soldiers."¹¹³

In contrast to Andrew’s organizational ambition, his rival Richard Norton understood himself to be "a father and mother, as well as guide philosopher and friend of the volunteers" who heeded no plans of organizational growth which were characteristic of Andrew.¹¹⁴ Both Andrew and Norton were inspired by similar social and cultural ideals in their work for the Allied cause. However, the two men brought with them different organizational ideas. Andrew appreciated an efficiency-oriented administration while Norton adhered to his idea of the self-sufficient and organizationally independent volunteer.

¹⁰⁹For continued calls for unified action, see Myron T. Herrick, "To Systematize our War-Chari-Charities," Literary Digest 55 (2 December 1916), 1468-9. "Statement of Mrs. Bacon at Red Cross, Wash-
¹¹⁰See the increase of disbursements in financial aid to drivers, expenses for such public relations tools as the film shown in the United States, and increased expenses for "General Administration. "Report of the American Field Service in France," 27 November 1917, Box 1, Folder 1, AFS Archives.
¹¹¹History, 1:68 and History, 3:444.
¹¹³Andrew, "For Love of France," The Outlook 114 (27 December 1916), 923.
¹¹⁴Acting Chairman of the American Red Cross, Wadsworth, to Richard Norton, TLS, 14 September 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.
8. In the “business of saving wounded soldiers:” A. Piatt Andrew (in center with cigarette) and Henry Davis Sleeper (to his left) with a group of volunteers in 1916. Courtesy of AFS Archives and Museum (© 1994) AFS Intercultural Programs, Inc.

Whereas Andrew began to conduct an educational organization with aims of growth and efficiency for aspiring men of equal social status, Norton believed himself to be a volunteer among others of similar maturity and financial background.

Norton’s organizational setup demonstrated this difference. In 1916, Norton merged his organization with that of Herman Harjes, the wealthy director of the Morgan-Harjes bank in Paris, which funneled large American loans to the French government. Harjes also was the official representative of the American Red Cross in France. Thus a total of three sections now came to be called the "Norton-Harjes sections," officially under the auspices of the American Red Cross.115

The different perception of what volunteering meant to the two principal organizers of American ambulance services along the front is best contrasted by observing their attention to public relations work. In the case of Richard Norton, this attention was hardly present at all. Letters by Eliot Norton to his brother from 1914 on essentially discuss one issue: Richard Norton’s neglect of any effort to provide material needed for proper public relations work. This was quite in keeping with the scholar’s conception of his own work. Richard Norton acted on the assumption that his was a personal and individual effort of aiding France, the Allies, and civilization. Norton drew on ideas of a strongly liberal background. In mid-Victorian professional tradition, which made him a character fit for the late nineteenth century, Richard Norton adhered to ideals of the individual operating in absence of hierarchical levels of commands, solely for his own ends and ideals. As far as Norton was concerned, he needed no help. As regards financial support for his endeavors, "the St. John Ambulance and Red Cross Societies render any assistance we ask."116 There was no need, then, to "prostitute what brains one may have for the amusement of the public."117

His volunteer work, Norton felt, needed no advertisement. Public relations work and advertising he considered disrespectful of his cultural refinement. The humble public was not part of his intellectual or social group. "It is the mental side I am trying to get + these notes may have value in later years if not now," he wrote about some articles he had actually written. "I am in no mood to write banalities."118 As one volunteer would reflect at Richard Norton’s funeral, "a man who was great in many ways, it was perhaps this indifference to outside judgments that was the greatest."119

Volunteers of Norton’s corps were well aware of the ideas of their commander. "I have been asked to appear in one of the local theatres for three days with slides from my own pictures and a short talk," one of Norton’s volunteers wrote to Eliot Norton. "Would

115The sections under Norton and Harjes included their own sections, and a third section led by one Mr. Kemp. At the same time, Andrew conducted twelve sections with the French Army. For a list of ambulance sections with the French Army, see "Etat des Sections Sanitaires Étrangères au 18 April 1917," AM, 18 April 1917, in Box 16 N 2766, Documents relating to G. Q. G. Direction de l'Arrière, Direction des service automobiles, (D.S.A.), Archives de l'Armée de Terre.

118Richard Norton to Sally Norton, ALS, 2 October 1914, Box 11, Richard Norton Papers.
119"Tribute of one of the members of the Norton-Harjes Ambulance Service, read at the American Church, Paris, August 4th, 1918," TM, Box 9, Folder 229, AFS Archives.
you consider this degrading or commercializing the service rendered?"

120 Unlike his brother, Eliot Norton, the representative of the Norton-Harjes sections in New York, understood that advertising was necessary. "I don’t like American newspaper publicity any more than you do," Eliot wrote his brother angrily, "but at the same time you must not carry your dislike for it to too great a length." 121 The St. John Ambulance and Red Cross Societies, too, could not provide Richard Norton with volunteers if he refused to tell them what this work was about. In a time when public relations work relied on letters reprinted in newspapers and books, Norton regularly defeated any such scheme by not adjusting his style to these needs. "Don’t labor under the apprehension that Richard writes me many details. He don’t [sic]," Eliot Norton pointed out to a London staff member. "He has never had a business training and the result is that he does not keep track of his correspondence," Eliot Norton reasoned. 122

Probably the largest public relations success was an interview by the New York Times with Henry James, whose chairmanship of the American Volunteer Motor Ambulance Corps in a way represented the cultural assumption of Richard Norton himself. His was a cultural undertaking of an elite and quite distinct from the efforts of the AAFS, which was doing things "on the cheap." 123 Henry James, aware that competition among the ambulance organizations existed, employed his rhetorical skills in "making the point, in the interest of clearness, that the American Ambulance Corps of Neuilly [Andrew’s AAFS], though an organization with which Richard Norton’s corps is in the fullest sympathy, does not come within the scope of his remarks." 124

This interview in the New York Times, however, remained a rare success. Occasionally, small notices appeared in the New York press and elsewhere. Yet even these articles sometimes defeated the purpose. To the American public, the differences between the various services such as the AAFS and the Norton sections were not quite clear--nor important, for that matter. As a result of Richard Norton’s weak efforts at public relations, the New York Times, for example, referred to his squad as the "Norton section of the American Ambulance." 125 Angrily, Eliot Norton pointed out to the staff in London that "the American Automobile Ambulance is the name of, or carries the significance to the public of, the Ambulance Corp connected with the hospital at Neuilly"--Andrew’s ambulance corps. 126 Funds intended for the Norton squad thus easily found their way into AAFS accounts. Not even some of his own family knew what Richard Norton did in France. "It was my understanding that your brother was connected, or serving, with the ambulances corps known as the 'American,'" a relative and donor explained to Eliot Norton. Because of this misunderstanding, another ambulance car had gone to the AAFS instead of the Norton corps. "Nothing was further from my thoughts than to bring any dis-

120 Snyder C. Rappleye to Eliot Norton, 9 January 1917, Box 6, Richard Norton Papers.
122 Eliot Norton to Morrison, 20 September 1916, Box 4, Richard Norton Papers
123 H. C. Hoskier to Anne Morgan, TL, 22 November 1916, Box 20, Folder 172, AFS Archives.
126 Eliot Norton to Morrison, TLS, 10 July 1916, Box 11, Norton Papers.
appointment your way," the relative excused himself.127

A. Piatt Andrew, on the other hand, understood the importance of public relations very well, and he brought the talents of a politician to the job. During his campaign for the congressional seat of Augustus P. Gardner before his departure to France in 1914, Andrew had climbed into an airplane with an eye on the press.128 Soon after Robert Bacon had put him in charge of the field service at the American Ambulance Hospital, Andrew sent letters home, intended for publication. In his July 1915 inspection report to the board of the hospital he announced that he had sent a letter to Theodore Roosevelt with the aim of getting it into the newspapers.129 And while Eliot Norton complained to his brother about the lack of information, William R. Hereford, head of the New York office of the American Ambulance Hospital, told Andrew how much he appreciated the information send to New York.130 Eliot Norton complained, "It makes me sick the way they [the AAFS] are getting money through the great efforts they make for publicity. . . . They have a got out 4 books and are showing a moving picture all over the country." 131 In terms of organizational growth and visibility of his undertaking, Andrew successfully conducted a propaganda war on the yet peaceful home front.

From the beginning, this public relations work of Andrew had two aims in mind. As Henry Sleeper pointed out after the war, the letters written home by the drivers were intended, first, for the benefit of the organization--recruiting drivers and raising funds. Second, however, "and equally stimulating as a possibility," these letters aimed at "establishing what might develop into a potent and active influence for the Allied Cause."132 The organizers of the AFS, in other words, joined the pro-preparedness and pro-intervention campaign at home. Unlike the American Red Cross, which also sent supplied to the "enemy," the AAFS consciously took sides. "As you can well believe," Andrew wrote in June 1916, "I am proud of belonging to an organization which serves France alone and which has no affiliations whatever with the enemy."133 The AAFS aided the "civilized countries" only. Thus, Andrew kept in mind the financial fallout of his advertising campaign. His organization, he felt, aided France efficiently and immediately. At the same time, however, the public relations effort in the United States, despite the humanitarian character of driving ambulances in France, was belligerent in character and political in intent. In this, Andrew’s dedication to France mingled with the political and social ideas advocated by promoters of the preparedness campaign in the United States. Indeed, from the beginning of its fundraising efforts in 1915, the funds raised by the AAFS in the United States had been provided with political intentions, and wealthy bankers had been among its first supporters. Edward J. De Coppet, a New York investment banker and one of the first to provide a three-digit sum for an ambulance car and its

128Andrew to his parents, 13 March 1914, Andrew Gray Collection.
129Andrew, "Inspection Report," TMS, 19 July 1915, Box 17, Folder 146, AFS Archives. Andrew to Theodore Roosevelt, TL, 13 July 1915, Box 3, Folder 30, AFS Archives.
130William R. Hereford to Andrew, TLS, 29 May 1915, Box 6A, Folder 69A, AFS Archives.
132American Field Service: History, 1:40.
133Andrew to Arthur Gleason, TL, 22 June 1916, Box 2, Folder 12, AFS Archives.
upkeep, along with his donation proposed to "start an anti-German movement - with propaganda to counteract the great distribution of German lies we are all receiving." Once the AAFS had taken separate quarters and detached itself from the hospital in Neuilly in 1916, Andrew increased his advertising efforts at home.

He did so with the help of Henry Sleeper, his friend and American representative of the AAFS. Under Sleeper’s direction, the AAFS opened offices in Boston in 1916, and later added an office in New York City. Here, AAFS office staff processed applications and organized propaganda in coordination with Andrew in the Paris headquarters. The AAFS employed a range of tools for its campaign. Andrew had his drivers write to the donors of automobiles, which were frequently reprinted by the local press as the latest report from the front.

The AAFS also published several books about its work. In August 1916, for example, Sleeper published the letters of a Gloucester neighbor and friend, Leslie Buswell, who had joined Andrew and his ambulance corps. The same year, Andrew and Sleeper saw Friends of France through the press, a book in which ambulance drivers described their heroic work, accompanied by a call for donations and volunteers. A load of magazine articles, furthermore, made the American Ambulance Field Service synonymous with ambulance work in France. "In fact, in New York and except among your friends," Eliot Norton pointed out to his brother Richard about the stiff competition by the AAFS, "your Corps is utterly unknown."

Probably the most successful propaganda tool of the AAFS were two movies, Our American Boys in the European War and Our Friend, France. The very idea of using a film for propaganda purposes was both new and ambitious. Just like the automobile, which characterized the work of the young ambulanciers behind the front, cinematography was in its very beginnings in 1916. It corresponded to what driving an ambulance was about. The automobile was still new to the American landscape and reserved to a mostly urban elite who could afford to own a car. The medium of the film, too, was of most recent origin, and, before the advent of the twenties, a largely urban affair. It probably best characterizes Andrew’s understanding of his own work. At once, the Inspector-General sought to raise the funds for his organization and advance the Allied cause in the United States. In doing so, he employed modern means in promoting his conservative ideas before the American public.

Our boys in the European War, the movie planned by Andrew in early 1916, was shot with the help of the French government. Andrew organized the showings in the United States by using a professional movie syndicate, the Triangle Film Corporation

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134 Sleeper to Andrew, 22 July 1915, in Beauport Chronicle, 202.
135 [Andrew] to Robert Bacon, TL, 22 June 1915, Box 3, Folder 29, AFS Archives.
138 For a list of the articles and books published on or by the AAFS, see American Field Service, History, 3:552-57.
based in New York City. The American Ambulance Field Service Movie Committee put the weight of important names on its letterhead: Anne Morgan and Mrs. W. K. Vanderbilt, for example, officially endorsed the movie and its cause. In the fall of 1916, Nanon Toby, Triangle’s representative for the film, organized showings on the East coast. After the first showing in the ballroom of the Hotel Majestic in New York City the film went straight to The Rialto, an exclusive New York City theatre on Times Square.140 In 1917, as the United States pulled closer to war, Andrew directed his campaign away from the East coast and towards a broader geographical audience. In February 1917, he granted John H. McFadden, Jr., a leave of absence from his service in Paris at a time when the Inspector-General thought about extending his work considerably.141 A similar film, Our Friend, France, now went on a tour of ninety-four showings throughout the nation.142 Even Kalamazoo learned about the heroic deeds of ambulancing.143

To a friend and supporter, Andrew had written that "our benefit . . . should be incidental and subsidiary to the larger purpose [of advertising the French cause]." Nanon Toby, however, understood that she was pursuing a "monster profit."144 Even though Andrew had argued that he intended to make the Allied cause known in every geographical region of the United States, the movie was not shown in the South and many other parts of the country. This was in keeping with the aim of raising funds for the AAFS in areas where it was most appealing and in keeping with Nanon Toby’s understanding of the campaign. Ultimately, however, Andrew’s political intentions and his organizational eagerness did not contradict each other. His AAFS immediately helped France in her struggle, he reasoned, and money donated to his organizations freed ambulancing Frenchmen for the trenches.

In the end, the movies proved to be effective and quite lucrative. From August 1916 through April 1917, the AAFS received a total of $174,255 in funds raised by the film.145 "We are working like Hell [sic] over here--recruiting, giving lectures, raising ambulances + getting a lot afs [AAFS] publicity," Walter Wheeler, who lectured on a Western tour, reported to Andrew. "We have succeeded pretty well + everybody in this part of the country knows all about the thing."146 And Eliot Norton received a letter from Herman Harjes, wondering whether it would not be possible to organize a film on their

140Nanon Toby to Andrew, TLS, 30 August 1916, Box 2, Folder 12, AFS Archives.
141See Chapter III for Andrew’s plans about an enlarged AAFS and its new role.
142List of showings of the A. A. F. S. Pictures,” see Box 63, Folder 658, AFS Archives.
143The Western trip took AAFS propaganda to Indianapolis, Cleveland, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Duluth, Des Moines, Omaha, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Santa Barbara, San Francisco, Burlingame, San Mateo, Portland (Oregon), Seattle, Spokane, Helena, Billings, Butte, Lincoln, Cedar Rapids, Kalamazoo, Grand Rapids, Oakland, Menlo Park, and Piedmont (California). See "Date concerning Western trip--List of Persons Instrumental in Showing," TM, Box 63, Folder 658, AFS Archives.
144Andrew to Henry P. Davison, TL, 1 February 1916, Box 2, Folder 12; Nanon Toby to Sleeper, TLS, 25 August 1916, Box 2, Folder 12, AFS Archives.
145Statement of Showings Handled Through Office of the Moving Picture Committee--Giving Amounts Sent to Lee, Higginson & Co.,” TM, n.d., Box 63, Folder 658, AFS Archives. The "Report of the American Field Service in France," November 1917, 22, indicates that in 1917, the AAFS earned $235,117 in net-profits from the movie. In Box 1, Folder 1, AFS Archives.
146Walter Wheeler to Andrew, ALS, 12 January 1917, Box 5, Folder 64, AFS Archives.
The appeal of the film in part stemmed from the Inspector-General's understanding of his audience. The films advertising the AAFS and the French cause catered to urban patricians eager for heroes and sacrifice.

In August 1916, Nanon Toby organized one of the first showings of *Our American Boys in the European War* in the wealthy resort town of Newport, Rhode Island, the very symbol of what contemporary Thorstein Veblen denounced as the American "leisure class." Funds would be forthcoming splendidly, Toby reasoned. Indeed, as one newspaper observed, the film had a special appeal to the audience here as "over six hundred devotees of society forsook the polo (for the Newport Cup), the tennis finals and other events of importance," to see American adolescents steer Fords to the front. The film was so successful in Newport because its monied elite linked the service rendered by the ambulance boys in France to their own ideas of social responsibility and leadership. Many of them had supported the French cause with vigor since the beginning of the war. Now, Andrew's films assured them of their own ideals tied to the Allied cause.

These ideals tied to what the interpretation of the ambulance cause as proposed by Henry James early in the war. Not individual fulfillment, but virtue and sacrifice for a common good was at bottom the ambulancier's motivation. "I prefer to think of them as moved," James replied, "first and foremost, not by the idea of fun or the sport they may have, or of the good thing they may make of the job for themselves, but by that of the altogether exceptional chance opened to them of acting blessedly and savingly for others." James thus distilled the idea one observer called "noblesse oblige," the selfless public service of an educated elite.

When Mrs. Astor hosted the film showing in Newport in 1916 (aided by Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Mrs. Harry Payne Whitney, and Mrs. Joseph Widener, among others), this monied elite rallied to a cause they considered their own. Indeed, these were *Our Boys in the European War* [italics mine]. "Here was something new!" one newspaper observed. "Men of their own environment, forsaking worldly pleasures . . . and risk[ing] their lives in the cause of humanity!" This was a "story of splendid self-denial." The idea of "sacrifice" and of "service," fittingly part of the organization's name, played central roles in public relations and the perception of the ambulance work in the United States. In the perception of their supporters, these ambulanceurs provided a cleansing experience for the entire nation, which was increasingly susceptible to an intruding materialism. "There isn't an American worth calling such who isn't under a heavy debt of obligation to these boys for what they have done," Theodore Roosevelt declared after viewing the film. "We are under an even greater debt to them than the French and Belgians are." And Mrs. Vanderbilt reasoned that "The splendid patri-
otism that inspired our forefathers during the Revolution has long since become lost in the onward march of commercialism and the hectic dash for pleasure.” In this misery, Andrew’s movie could counteract these forces by instilling a new patriotism and sense of national purpose in the young. Come to think of it, why not organize such an ambulance service right here in the United States?153 As Mrs. Bacon summarized, “The film makes one forget to be selfish.”154

The movie itself supported these ideas. Andrew had explained his plans for the movie to French Ambassador Jules Jusserand in March 1916, pointing out that the normal life of American ambulanciers behind the front should be depicted, including an outdoor mass in which his American ambulance boys were to participate.155 And the movie would indeed not only show AAFS Fords in their work along the front, but would contain a "Soldiers’ mass celebrated out of doors in a Ruined Town" in which "American Ambulances form a background for the altar." Here, on the front in France, American boys received their baptism in religious unity with their French comrades. As the program to the film highlights, "Americans as well as Poilus [are] welcomed by the priest."156 This religious connotation resonated with Theodore Roosevelt’s words upon viewing the movie. "The most important thing a nation can save is its own soul," the Rough Rider argued. In France, "these young men . . . have been helping this nation save its soul."157 Andrew’s ambulance service operated in tone with a longing for "sacrifice" and redemption in the United States. Our Boys in the European War brought this message into American movie theatres as a religious appeal for everyone to share.

Perceptions of Ambulancing

In the years of American neutrality, Richard Norton and A. Piatt Andrew took their nineteenth-century ideals of chivalry and "noblesse oblige" to France. As representatives of a monied and educated American class, they discovered in the mud behind the trenches an opportunity to test their manhood in the face of danger. As Henry Sleeper put it, to experience of sacrifice in the ambulance service thus provided an "inspiration which is better than peace"158 Their ambulance organizations, furthermore, fought a battle which many at home understood to be part of a campaign not merely for intervention, but for an Eastern elite and its reassertion of leadership.

Yet in their approach and organizational style, these two men displayed profound differences. Richard Norton acted without regard for a "public" to which he might explain his actions. The patrician acted in a pure liberal way by dedicating himself to the cause of culture and morality. He felt an obligation (not personal satisfaction or adventure) to do so; it was for him a question of status. Much later, he would remember that

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154Triangle Film Clippings, Box 63, Folder 657, AFS Archives.
155Andrew to Jules Jusserand, TL, 6 March 1916, Box 2, Folder 12, AFS Archives.
156“Notre Amie 'La France,'” Box 70, AFS Archives. "Poilus:" slang for French soldier.
158Sleeper in Andrew, Letters Written Home from France, vi.
among his drivers, "there were a certain number of various sorts of human nuisances" who asked the ambulance corps to help them out financially when they ran short of personal funds. For Norton, ambulancing along the French front was an undertaking for already well established daredevils.

A. Piatt Andrew, on the other hand, always took organizational growth for granted. Behind the front, his sections competed against others and aimed for "exclusive control." Sensing the danger of ambulancing as a character-shaping quality, Andrew turned the field service into an educational facility for monied college students. Indeed, considering Andrew’s businesslike way, what seems alien today was its connection to an outdated gospel of heroic sacrifice, danger, and images of knights-errant caring for the wounded. As Andrew demonstrates, these ideas did not contradict each other in 1916. Andrew at once utilized the standardized Model-T Ford and the movie as the symbols of a new age that already implied the mass culture of the twenties, and yet projected himself as the heroic leader in charge of a fleet of knightly ambulanciers saving the humble French. If anything, the Inspector-General represented the conservatism of a progressive age.

Both men’s motivation built on the assumption that their liberal ideas—perfectly represented in their voluntary "service"—matched the nationalism they advocated. In 1917, as the army followed them across the Atlantic, this assumption was challenged.

159Richard Norton to Eliot Norton, 11 June 1918, Box 1, Richard Norton Papers.
160"Report of Ambulance Inspector to American Hospital," TL, 5 July 1915, Box 17, Folder 147, AFS Archives.
The entry of the United States into the World War placed a new aspect upon the ambulance service proposition, for just as President Lincoln stated that the nation could not exist half slave and half free so an organization of the Army and with the Army could not exist half military and half volunteer.

The Radiator, 25 December 1918, 3.
CHAPTER III

CONSERVATIVES IN AN ERA OF PATRIOTISM

Great Expectations

In April 1917, when the United States declared war, Andrew was conscious that he had created one of the most visible American organizations aiding the Allies. The Inspector-General of the AAFS felt an immense joy now that his own country had joined the struggle. "Driving down the Avenue de l’Opera, I nearly ran over a man, my eyes were so dimmed by tears," Andrew wrote home. In 1915, Andrew had asked the readers of the Boston Herald whether America was "no longer a country of ideals beyond success in business and the accumulation of material wealth and comfort?" He now felt that it was in part due to his efforts that his country was ready to make the sacrifice which characterized him and his ambulanciers. Because of his achievements, such as the size and the visibility of his organization on the western front and at home, furthermore, he expected that the AAFS would play a more significant role even before American troops crossed the Atlantic, and certainly once they had done so.

The spring of 1917 was high tide for the field service. Once Germany had declared unrestricted submarine warfare, the ambulance squads served as an outlet for the newly awakened patriotic spirit of young American men. As Lieutenant H. A. Harrison, second in command of another ambulance squad in Paris, told a New York Times reporter after the United States declaration of war, "any one in an American uniform is now a conquering hero in Paris." He had seen sailors in Paris and "counted eight handsome young women around one of them." In the absence of army recruiters immediately after the United States had joined the Allies, the flow of volunteers eager to be among the first Americans to reach the firing line multiplied. "The men of America are simply crazy to be over here and in the game," a medical officer observed. At times, Andrew was overwhelmed with the hundreds of volunteers who were arriving on the steamers and set up large barracks in the park of the AAFS headquarters at 21 rue Raynouard in Paris. Just like volunteers of previous years, most of them arrived to drive ambulances along the front. Since 1915, the AAFS had been fetching wounded from the trenches and transporting them back to hospitals and trains in the rear. In keeping with international regulations, ambulance drivers had never carried guns. Indeed, international regulations even forbade them to transport soldiers or rifles in their ambulances. Despite the aspect of danger, which ambulanciers had always relished, this work had been legally neutral and peaceful. But now Andrew had new assignments for those who arrived in Paris.

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1 Andrew to his parents, 6 April 1917, Andrew Gray Collection.
2 Boston Herald, 3 June 1915.
In a report to the board of the American Ambulance Hospital, to which the AAFS officially reported, Andrew explained that he had "taken part of that supply" of volunteers and organized "another service of an entirely different character. I speak of a motor transport section which is to be used . . . in the carrying of munitions to the front," he wrote. The Inspector-General now assigned volunteers to trucks, not ambulances. Andrew, furthermore, sent the first of these volunteers to the front only after they "were given muskets and after a short period of drilling." Indeed, in the park of the 21 rue Raynouard headquarters in Paris, volunteers now lined up for a formal military drill. The new transport sections of Andrew’s field service thus abandoned the protection of the Geneva Treaty. "This service of course is quite distinct from the ambulance service," Andrew told the board. "It will be known as the American Field Service [not American Ambulance Field Service] and severs all connections with the sanitary service." Andrew was quite aware of the unique role this new service was assuming within the arena of French-American relations. "I wish to register here," he told the board, "a date which will be memorable in our history, the date on which the first organized body of Americans left for this front carrying muskets on their shoulders." During American neutrality, the field service had been characterized as an organization providing a "baptism of fire." In April 1917, Andrew extended this service under the assumption that the American Army had no monopoly in organizing armed units of Americans for duty on the European front.

The transport sections had been the idea of Commandant Doumenc, a French official, who had asked Andrew for ten thousand camion (transport) drivers immediately after the American declaration of war. The French, Andrew cabled to Robert Bacon, "prefer men of [the] type in our service, and that sections be organized on the same basis as our present service." The urgency of the military situation demanded such action, Andrew argued. He informed Bacon: "[I] am absolutely confident America cannot immediately help [the] French Army in any other important way." The new camion sections were to consist of eighteen to twenty trucks, and were to carry munitions, supplies, and various other material and military supplies to the front. The French provided the trucks, and Andrew’s volunteers were to be "fitted into [the] existing [administrative field service] framework as they arrive." While these were bold new steps away from the ambulance service in 1917, Andrew had envisioned a larger role of the AAFS ever since the beginning of the year when volunteers had first appeared in unprecedented numbers.

At the end of January Andrew already pointed out that "We suddenly begin to see the possibility of practically doubling the service before summer." In keeping with his plans for expansion, Andrew now stressed that the AAFS represented the United States, not merely a pro-war campaign directed by an elite Eastern minority. In a letter to Robert Woods Bliss, a high ranking Red Cross official and AAFS supporter, Andrew stressed

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5“Monthly report of the American Ambulance Field Service to the Board of Governors of the American Hospital,” TM, April 1917, Box 1, Folder 6, AFS Archives.
6Andrew to Bacon, cable, 5 April 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-b, AFS Archives.
7“Organization of the French Army Automobile Service,” 1917, Box 18, Folder 151, AFS Archives.
8Andrew to Robert Bacon, cable, 5 April 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-b, AFS Archives.
9Andrew to Walter Wheeler, TL, 31 January 1917, Box 5, Folder 65.
that it was universities in the Midwest and on the West Coast which provided the man-
power for his ambulance service. Andrew did not mention Harvard, the school which had
in fact supplied most volunteers during the preceding years. He thus strategically denied
the Ivy League character of the field service. The purpose of the Rainbow Division, the
first American division to cross the Atlantic, was "to distribute the honor of early partici-
pation in the war over a wide area." Sensing that his own organization might become an
official American representative on the European front, Andrew proposed that his or-
ganization had such a national character.

Furthermore, two months before he established the camion service, Andrew had
prepared the way for this idea by consciously enlarging the ambulance organization. In
February, Andrew had granted ambulance driver John H. McFadden, Jr., a leave of ab-
sence from his field service position in France, and sent him to tour the United States to
raise money and men "to allow the work to go on and assume somewhat more significant
proportions." McFadden traveled through the Midwest, "taking in all the towns of im-
portance en route." Thus, even before March 1917 when the first volunteer climbed into
a munitions truck for the French Army, Andrew had speculated and planned a larger role
for his AAFS. Now, as the United States was entering the war, Andrew felt from a self-
conscious perspective of the organization's growth that he could take bold steps. In doing
so, he introduced himself to the President and his Secretary of War by cabling, "We have
more than five hundred automobile ambulances with French Army in France and Balkans
[which were] given by Americans and [were] driven during past two years by American
volunteers. We are," he went on to propose, "in [a] position and should like to help [the]
War Department organize [a] similar service for American troops coming to France." Andrew's field service had been based on the idea of volunteering for France. The In-
spector-General now proposed to provide the logistics for a similar ambulance service in
anticipation of the American military; a private semi-military organization catering bel-
ligerent services to both a foreign and its own government.

Accordingly, between April 11 and April 19, Andrew cabled or wrote letters to
Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Colonel Edward M. House, and
other government officials. Andrew asked for official recognition from the War Depart-
ment to continue service with the French Army with the endorsement of his own country;
to be entrusted with the future ambulance work of the American Army; and, finally, to
gain recognition for his transport sections, including official titles for the officers in that
service. In return, Andrew offered to his government "immediate official representation
on the French front."

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10 "Report of the Secretary of War," War Department, Annual Report, 1917 (Washington D.C: Gov-
11 Andrew to Robert Woods Bliss, TL, 5 February 1917, Box 5, Folder 65.
12 Andrew to John H. McFadden, Jr., TL, February 1917, Box 5, Folder 65, AFS Archives.
13 Jack McFadden to Andrew, TLS, 24 March 1917, Box 5, Folder 66, AFS Archives.
14 Andrew to Sleeper, cable, n.d. [6 April 1917?], Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives.
15 Andrew to Colonel House, [19 April 1917?], in Sleeper to Andrew, cable, n.d., Box 7, Folder 71-
B, AFS Archives.
Andrew matched these intentions with organizational changes, all of which moved the AFS away from humanitarian service and towards a more outspoken belligerent ideology. In May, the Inspector-General organized training camps for the drivers of both ambulance and transport sections. This was in part a solution to facilitate the large number of men coming to Paris to drive ambulances.\(^\text{16}\) Of the three camps Andrew set up, one was declared an officers’ training camp to facilitate men "who have displayed conspicuous devotion, intelligence and capacity for leadership." The camp, the Herald reported, "will allow these men to qualify as lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in the army."\(^\text{17}\) The recruiting policy of the AFS, furthermore, reflected Andrew’s new policies. In February, the organization filed with the Secretary of War a demand that its ambulance volunteers "may not be called back to this country but shall be notified that their present work has the sanction of their own Government, and that they are exempt from the obligation of volunteering in other services so long as they remain in active members of this one."\(^\text{18}\) The field service, in other words, claimed immunity from government interference in its own recruitment efforts. Of course, Andrew still took for granted that any recruitment effort in the United States would be based on a volunteer-system, not on the recruitment policy President Woodrow Wilson would eventually institute on May 18.\(^\text{19}\) In April, university units volunteered to enlist on the same terms as the Army and the Navy.\(^\text{20}\) Beginning May 24, all new recruits were required to remain for the duration of the war.\(^\text{21}\) At the beginning of June, Andrew argued that men should understand that they "have no right to choose" between the transport and the ambulance services.\(^\text{22}\) He cabled to Sleeper about the camion service: "In order to avoid embusqués for future[,"] tell all strong men twenty or under and over thirty [that] we will gladly give them choice regarding kind of service [they would like to join], sending them out immediately, but all conscriptable men must without exception be assignable [to] transport or ambulance service according [to] our needs."\(^\text{23}\)

The camion service was not merely another service the AFS rendered. Rather, Andrew focused his efforts on this branch of volunteer work. In tune with the aspirations for a more significant role in the American Army, he wrote that the "Transport work [is]  

\(^\text{16}\)Aujay to Directeur des Services Automobiles au G. Q. G., TLS, 3 June 1917, Box 16 N 2766, Documents relating to G. Q. G. Direction de l’Arrière, Direction des services automobiles (D.S.A.), Archives de l’Armée de Terre. 
\(^\text{17}\)New York Herald (Paris), 8 May 1917. The Paris edition of the Herald was sold in France. The New York Times pointed out to its audience in America that the training camp lead men to “appointments as officers of the French Army after a few weeks of intensive training.” New York Times, 8 May 1917, sec. 1, p. 4. 
\(^\text{18}\)“Copy of Statement Filed With the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, War Department,” TM, February 1917, Box 7, Folder 72, AFS Archives. 
\(^\text{19}\)Woodrow Wilson thus decided against a recruiting system based on volunteers, and instead opted for a draft system. In this way, of course, he worked against his political rival Theodore Roosevelt, but also against the ideas of Andrew. 
\(^\text{20}\)Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 13 April 1917, Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives. 
\(^\text{21}\)Luke Doyle to Andrew, TLS, 25 May 1917, Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives. 
\(^\text{22}\)Andrew to Sleeper, TL, 3 June 1917, Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives. 
\(^\text{23}\)“Embusqués,” French for shirkers.
more important both for [the kind of] service rendered and [for the] future possibilities [of the] men concerned. Their training," he cabled Sleeper, "will make them useful eventually [for] American troops, for artillery, tractors, armored motor cars, tanks, etc." This policy seemed to find support by the government. "Washington has granted us permission to enlist men of draft age physically fit for military service," a staff member in the capital wrote to Andrew’s aide.

Indeed, the American government did not mind the public perception of Andrew's work in France during the spring of 1917. America’s new Ally, the French, faced severe problems on the front, problems including mutinies and low public morale. The immediate appearance of the American flag on the front would signal that relief was at hand. Shortly after the camion service had been initiated, the New York Herald (Paris) observed that although the service was "conducted by volunteers under private initiative, the movement has the informal endorsement of American officials." When AFS camion volunteers got ready for the front as early as May, the New York Sun announced: "Americans To Enter Battle On Wednesday." Others, too, conceived of these volunteers as the "first American belligerents." Four days later, the Herald reported that this "was probably the first time that a body of Americans bearing arms has passed through the streets of Paris." Among the guests of a dinner dedicated to American volunteers in France were William G. Sharp, American Ambassador to France, Colonel Girard, director in chief of the automobile service of all the French armies, and Major Church, representing the American Military Commission. Charles Carroll of Carrollton noted that the transport service extended ideas which the field service and the Lafayette Escadrille (a volunteer aviation corps) had long represented. An American flag was presented to the two organizations, "and it is particularly fitting at this moment when a new camion service is being inaugurated."

Indeed, in April and May, Andrew was provided with indicators that his government would grant him official status and acknowledgment. Thus, Andrew introduced a profound change into his organization. During the period of neutrality, driving ambulances for the Allies had always been related to danger. The young men steering their cars to the trenches had been thrilled by the danger and the experience. As an educational organization providing a "baptism of fire" in France, the AAFS had catered to a Eastern elite and its longing for heroic sacrifice. During the spring of 1917, however, Andrew moved away from heroism and towards a policy more immediately aiding the French military effort. Andrew now stressed this new military work,

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24 Andrew to Sleeper, cable, 4 June 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
25 George R. Young to Stephen Galatti, 8 June 1917, Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives.
27 New York Sun, 7 May 1917.
28 L’Ambulance, April and May 1918, Box 60, Folder 591, AFS Archives.
30 Ibid. The flag was represented to the aviation corps and ambulance sections other than Andrew’s. Nevertheless, Carrollton’s remarks aimed at Andrew’s camion service.
31 In April 1917, Arthur Clifford Kimber, volunteer for a University of California ambulance section, had carried the first official American flag to the French front—to Section fourteen of the AAFS. Arthur Clifford Kimber, The Story of the First Flag (San Francisco, The Friends of France, 1920).
which had been but an aspect of the earlier ambulance work. By launching his new projects, Andrew more openly avowed his personal devotion to the war, and to his volunteer organization as an important force for winning it. The camion service and the training camp provided the field service with a new identity. Andrew could now inform the public that the organization would be called "The American Field Service," dropping the reference to the ambulance work from its name.  

Motivated by the large number of new volunteers who were embarking for the rue Raynouard headquarters of the AFS, Andrew envisioned a large private organization as the advance guard of the American military in France. The recently equipped AFS offices in New York, he learned, were able to support a larger enterprise. "[W]e can in a short time send you the 20,000 men you are seeking," an aide wrote to Andrew. The "branches in other cities are working well," Andrew learned from an aide in the capital, "and when the time comes we can make it nation-wide."  

"American representatives today," he cabled to Boston, "should emphasize American duty, not humanitarianism, which [is] no longer wholly applicable [to] our service." The volunteer spirit which had provided the background for heroic sacrifice for an adolescent elite slowly gave way to military drill and labor. At a time when the American Army began to draft for its own ranks, the Inspector-General sought to retain his ambulance and transport "business" under his own direction. He was willing to compromise heroism for military drill. By doing so, however, he also compromised the support he had received in previous years.

Transport Problems

In the United States, public relations for the AAFS stressed the sanctity of service for the wounded. While the danger involved in driving ambulances had been a central aspect of the field service propaganda, the neutrality of the organization had always been taken for granted. Unlike the ambulanciers, however, munitions truck drivers were not covered by the Geneva Convention and thus were legally belligerent. As leading Americans in Paris toasted the camion service in early 1917, Andrew’s organization was disrupted by dissent both in France and in America.

Problems arose primarily from the fact that Andrew made the supply of these new transport sections a main concern, and told many a newly arrived man to climb into a truck instead of an ambulance. As a group of Cornell students arrived to drive ambu-

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32 New York Times, 8 May 1917, sec. 1, p. 4. The AAFS would henceforth be called “The American Field Service” or “American Volunteer Corps,” the paper wrote.
33 Luke Dole to Andrew, TLS, 25 May 1917, Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives.
34 Andrew to Sleeper, cable, 4 June 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
lances for the field service, Andrew later explained, the "situation was explained to them, and to a man they agreed to put aside their original intention and to respond to the new call." Not all men, however, were willing to give up their original intentions. Frank O. Robinson, soon after his arrival from Dartmouth a camion driver himself, conceded that driving trucks—when compared to ambulanceing at the front—was an "unromantic life." The new service lacked the aspect of chivalry felt by ambulanciers. Within the context of neutrality, driving an ambulance had been socially accepted sacrifice and heroism.

"Trucking to the trenches," however, carried with it notions of physical labor foreign to an educated elite. Henry Sleeper inquired of Andrew "if I cannot send over carpenters and workmen of some sort to enable you to get out three sections a week until we have fulfilled our promises in regard to ambulances."

Many volunteers, confronted with the demand that they drive trucks instead of ambulances promised to them at home, were unhappy with the new arrangement. "We descended at 21 rue Raynouard to but a cold reception," one volunteer confided to his diary upon arrival at the AFS headquarters. "We found we were to be drafted for the camion transport service . . . and that there was dissention [sic] and ill-nature in our unit." Bitterly, some joined the truckers. Others abandoned the AFS.

On June 4, Andrew’s rival Richard Norton wrote that when a group AFS volunteers learned that they were to drive trucks, "some eighty of them struck and joined us instead." Many volunteers who had signed up with the AFS now departed for other ambulance services. "Brother Andrew . . .," Richard Norton wrote to his brother Eliot Norton, "has put himself into a most beautiful mess over this game. I have no doubt that his intentions were perfectly good, but the disaster has proved what I have always maintained that he is no organizer. He bit off more than he could chew. . . . These men," he wrote with some satisfaction, "are looking for him now with tomahawks and spears." And his brother Eliot Norton remarked, "[T]hey have more or less killed their ambulance service."

Meanwhile, in the New York Herald (Paris), a group of University of California students publicly asserted their loyalty, and expressed their "entire satisfaction" with the AFS and "confidence in its leaders." "Such an expression would be superfluous had not considerable dissatisfaction and much unjust criticism been prevalent," they wrote in a letter to the editor. At the Field Service headquarters in Boston, Henry Sleeper felt the pressure, too. "I fear the average American boy is accustomed to having his own way. It is not much use to curse and brow-beat as one feels inclined to in . . . many cases; the

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36Ibid., 3:13.
37Henry Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 26 May 1917, Box 7, Folder 75, AFS Archives.
38Warren Lansing, Diary entry 5 July 1917, AMs, Warren Lansing Papers, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford, California.
42New York Herald (Paris), 3 July 1917.
As leaders of a volunteer organization which relied on private support, field service officials could not force anyone to accept an assignment with a particular service.

When Andrew shifted his focus to the new transport work, he also disregarded the fact that the fundraising and recruiting success still relied on the concept of the ambulance service—not a semi-military body such as the transport service. Quite unlike ambulance cars in Andrew’s movie Our Friend, France, munitions trucks would never provide a spiritually appropriate background for an altar of adolescent sacrifice. Andrew disregarded the wishes of many donors and parents who were pledging their money or their sons for ambulance work, not for truck driving. At the headquarters of the Field Service in Boston, Sleeper faced attacks from all sides. Angrily, he pointed out to Andrew that "people here cannot understand that the Transport Service means anything but ‘dog’ work." An organization which had made possible an educational experience for heroic ambulance drivers now smacked of entering the French Army and expatriation. As another office aide put it, the transport service now joined the dangerous aviation service in parents’ perception: both became "like red flags to an angry bull." If money "and enthusiasm" donated to the ambulance sections was appropriated for transport service, Sleeper warned Andrew, it would "arouse not only challenge and criticism, but political antagonism."

As Sleeper had to appear before "committees of highly intelligent business men in various places," and respond to hundreds of letters and cables from universities and parents, he saw the foundations of the organization undermined by Andrew’s new commitments. Andrew, in the meantime, asserted publicly that "[n]othing could be further from the truth than the statement that this service has ceased to be an ambulance service." He reassured worried parents that "the work upon which they [camion drivers] are entering is in no way more dangerous than the work of driving ambulances, but is more continuous." In this prepared letter he assured "that the men themselves will be happier on that account."

Fundraising efforts were also curtailed by the fact that once the United States had declared war, many Americans held on to their money or turned away from private organizations and towards their government and Liberty Loans when looking for a way to support the Allied cause. "Tell Doc that his theory that the people would give more generously on account of the threatened United States War, was just about as wrong as it could be," McFadden wrote to Andrew’s aide. In April, Mrs. Julia O. Bacheldor offered an entire ambulance section not to the AFS or another private ambulance corps, but
rather to the War Department. The financial basis of such work was threatened at the same time as Andrew expanded his private American war effort in France. At the same time, the American Red Cross emerged as a huge presence, throwing a long fiscal shadow over the more than one hundred American relief organizations in France. A staff member warned Andrew that "[the new president of the Red Cross war council Henry P.] Davison at the head of it with President and Cabinet behind them are out for [a] $100,000,000 campaign. It wipes out all other war charities until this is completed." Andrew’s new organization faced political problems as well. The effort to equip ten thousand American volunteers for the front could be misunderstood as a challenge to the American Army, keen on preserving an identity distinct from the Allies, and opposed to amalgamation with their troops. Unlike the army at home, Andrew relied on an existing system of recruiters in the United States, as well as experience and training camps in France. It was not surprising that Andrew’s assumptions were questioned in Washington. Sleeper cautioned Andrew about the camion sections that "The papers have given the impression that it is a fighting [unit]." Sleeper wanted frequent updates about the new corps, to be able to prepare the government for information published elsewhere. Unlike Andrew, who kept informed about the situation at home by reading newspapers and letters, the American representative had a more immediate sense of the political situation. He asked: "Why embarrass the War Department here, who are letting us alone in the matter. They are willing to look through the small end of the telescope--if we don’t hit them in the face with such facts [as recruiting ten thousand drivers]." As Luke Doyle had pointed out to Andrew in late May, the service had been criticized in the United States for taking men within conscription age range. The AFS, Doyle indicated, might have to confine itself to men over thirty years of age. This would dramatically alter the character of the field ambulance service, which had emerged as an educational institution catering to a young elite during the preceding years. Andrew was not easily willing to change this characteristic of his organization. "It is our intention to greatly develop both lines of service with the French Army in the future," he told the New York Herald in Paris, "drawing primarily from men under or over conscriptable years for the ambulance work and using volunteers between twenty-one and thirty for the harder and more continuous work of munitions transport." Transport work, in other words, would henceforth be undertaken by older volunteers. The ambulance section, however, were to retain the college-age personnel which had distinguished them before 1917. As Andrew thus meant to funnel volunteers into the service he thought them best equipped for, he conceptualized his role

52New York Herald (Paris), 21 April 1917. "‘These are the times when every patriotic American should do what is possible, and I am going to try and do my share,’” she argued.
53Luke Doyle to Andrew, TLS, 25 May 1917, Box 7, Folder 73.
54Sleeper to Andrew, ALS, n.d., Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives.

in the AFS like a military commander assigning his men to their positions. Indeed, this manpower policy which considered volunteers a "supply" for military service starkly contrasted with the heroic deeds of ambulancing, which had always stressed the sacrifice of the individual and his knightly courage.

Despite these problems, Andrew’s vision of the future role of the AFS became clear. In the spring of 1917, the Inspector-General sought to retain the independence of the service under his direction. The service was to consist, ideally, of both the ambulance service and the transport sections. If possible, both should continue to aid the French war effort. Andrew felt that his experience would allow him to organize similar services later for the American Army. Both Sleeper and Andrew hoped that the army would allow them to run their service without the crushing domination of a military hierarchy. At the same time, they favored militarization in order to retain the benefits of an integration and its national rewards while preserving the possibility for personal achievement outside the military machine. "I think it can be done," Henry Sleeper wrote to Andrew, "although it will be the first and only instance in the history of our country--that is, the only instance of an organization like ours--having so much self-governing power." 56 Somewhat like his supporter Theodore Roosevelt, who considered taking his volunteer unit of Rough Riders to France and new heroic battles under private command, Andrew sought to retain the private initiative which had characterized his organization in the previous years.

On both sides of the Atlantic, AFS staff worked towards this end. In April 1917, a French Military Commission under the leadership of Maréchal Joffre visited the United States. By this time, the various volunteer ambulance corps took care of a large portion of the ambulance work for the French Army. In addition to twelve AFS sections, the American Red Cross (Norton-Harjes units) had three units on the front, and other British, French, and Russian organizations provided twenty-four additional ambulance sections to the French Army. 57 The French Mission requested that the United States army take over the ambulances in service with the French Army, and provide another fifty ambulance sections immediately. 58

The ambulance service, the French agreed with Andrew, would provide instant visibility and effective help within a functioning and well-established organizational structure. In a War Department memorandum, the dispatch of one hundred ambulance sections was considered. 59 In mid-May, however, nothing had been decided with regard

56 Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 23 June 1917, Box 7, Folder 73, AFS Archives.
57 List of ambulance sections serving with the French armies, AMs, 18 April 1917, Box 16 N 2766, Documents relating to G. Q. G. Direction de l’Arrière, Direction des services automobiles (D.S.A.), Archives de l’Armée de Terre.
59 Memorandum, War Department, Office of the Surgeon General, TMs, 3 May 1917, Box 4345, Historical Date United States Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives, Washington D. C. This memorandum proposed that “these sanitary units are to be utilized by the French Government until the arrival of the American troops, when they are to be turned over to the military forces of the United States.” Another source indicates that the French commission
to the future of the AFS. When André Tardieu arrived in America as High Commissioner to the United States in that month, Andrew made sure to supply this old friend with his ideas about the militarization of the Field Service. Andrew's ideas had been endorsed by Colonel Girard, his contact in the French Army, and by the American Military Mission in France. In the spring of 1917, Andrew worked with the backing of the French government in his attempts to argue his case before his own. A French hope for speedy supply of men and material from the United States probably played no small role in French considerations in supporting Andrew.

On his visit to America, Joffre asked the United States to enter the war soon "with such elements as are ready." In his memo to André Tardieu, Andrew made clear that the American Field Service was such an element. The AFS provided Americans, Andrew argued, "a possibility for immediate help to France." AFS volunteers had for years shown the American flag on the front, and thus represented the friendship between these two countries. Now he told Tardieu to press for official recognition and militarization of the AFS by the American government. Andrew wanted to ensure that the hundreds of men joining him every week would fulfill their duty with the official endorsement of the American government; their commissions, he demanded, should correspond to American military titles.

Referring to arguments put forward by Colonel Girard and Commandant Doumenc of the French Army, Andrew pointed out that the camion sections were "the best opportunity for America to provide immediate aid and men," and that these French officials had requested the AFS to furnish and organize such a service. For two years, the Republican Andrew had worked in opposition to the political constellation in America. Now that the Democratic President Woodrow Wilson had decided for war, he asked Tardieu to help him keep his institutional independence, and yet gain recognition from his one-time political opponents.

Before the American Army crossed the Atlantic, therefore, Andrew had great expectations. In this, he mingled more traditional ideas of private initiative which were so characteristic of the nineteenth century and more recent ideas of efficiency and drill as modern means to an increasingly belligerent end. In his perception, the battle against the "Hun," a battle he had implicitly fought with his ambulance army during the previous years, demanded strong actions by those who were ready. As he told his volunteers to


60 Andrew to Sleeper, cable, received 26 April 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives. Tardieu had been lecturer at Harvard at the time Andrew taught there. Andrew knew Tardieu well.

61 For French support, see also a letter by Jules Jusserand to André Tardieu, TL, received 23 April 1917, Box 16 N 1017, Collection Tardieu, Service Automobile, Achats, Ambulances Automobiles, Archives de l'Armée de Terre. Jusserand asked Tardieu to help preserve the independent character and "personality" of the AFS.


63 Andrew, Memorandum to André Tardieu, TMs, [ca. April 1917], Box 13 N 107, Collection Tardieu, Service Automobiles, Achats, Ambulances Automobile, Archives de l'Armée de Terre.
drive munitions trucks, he found that he lived up to his own expectations of private ini-
tiative and duty to his nation. His ideas of private initiative, however, were about to be
transformed in the United States, where the American Army struggled into gear itself.
Duty, not initiative, would emerge as the dominant term. Into these changes, the Inspect-
ator-General sailed with hopes for great "service." What was more, he seemed without
competition from his usual rivals. Norton and Harjes, Andrew cabled Sleeper, "dont [sic]
want their services militarized or to enter upon general transport proposition. This leaves
us free without competition to attempt great work."64

Norton, Harjes, and the Coming of Kean

At first, not even the government seemed to emerge as a rival to Andrew’s plans
to organize American ambulance sections with the French Army on a somewhat larger
scale. As mobilization got underway, however, it became clear that the new military ap-
paratus would become integrative in an unprecedented scale. In the Civil War, the private
Sanitary Commission had worked in loose cooperation with the government. What now
evolved as World War I, however, was to see an American Army with more immediate
control over its various parts. "The business now is undramatic, practical, and of scient-
ific definiteness and precision," President Wilson declared upon signing the Selective
Service Act on May 18.65 The heroic chivalry brought to France by volunteers before
1917 gave way to conscription and centralized authority. From May 1917 on, the Medi-
cal Department translated these ideas for the ambulance knights in France.

The first blow to Andrew’s plan to attempt "great work" came when the admini-
stration at home decided to organize its own ambulance service. By the end of May, the
Medical Department had approved the formation of the new United States Army Ambu-
lance Service (USAAS). In doing so, the Medical Department had learned from An-
drew’s and Norton’s corps and modeled its own sections after theirs. The setup of the
units reflected the personnel blueprint the volunteer ambulanciers had used. Also, just
like Andrew’s field service, the USAAS was to use a standard car--the Model-T Ford.66
Finally, while Americans were to steer the government’s Fords, the French government
was to tell them where to go: just like Andrew’s and Norton’s corps, the USAAS was to
serve with the French Army and under its command.67 As part of these plans, the Medical
Department erected Camp Crane in Allentown, Pennsylvania, where it soon instructed
recruits and drilled under the auspices of the Medical Department for service with ambu-
lance

64Andrew to Sleeper, cable, received 26 April 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
65Quoted in Kennedy, Over Here
66Major General M. W. Ireland, The Medical Department of The United States Army in The World
67John R. Smucker, The History of The United States Army Ambulance Service With The French
and Italian Army: 1917, 1918, 1919 (Allentown, Pennsylvania: United States Army Ambulance Service
Association, [1967]), 11.
15. Herman H. Harjes and one of his ambulances of the “Formation Harjes,” which merged with Richard Norton’s American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps in 1916. Reprinted, with permission, from the collection of Alan Albright, Davis, California.
cars. Thus, Andrew’s proposal that he aid in expanding his own service to such an end was disregarded. In a step which seems unsurprising today, the government preferred to retain more direct control of its war effort.

In 1917, however, the decision by the Medical Department to establish its own ambulance sections with the French Army, and thus to disregard Andrew’s claim for running such an organization, was not preordained. To many, the possibility of subcontracting this work to a private ambulance organization while legally integrating it by referring military titles upon its members had been quite real. The decision of the War Department in favor of the USAAS, Henry Sleeper remembered later, had caused confusion as presidents and faculty members of universities "telegraphed us to ask if they should accede to this request [for sending men to the USAAS instead of the AFS]."\(^{68}\) To the public and to Andrew, the extent to which mobilization conferred new powers upon the federal government was new. Andrew, to be sure, brought important skills as an administrator to his job of shaping his AFS into the huge semi-military volunteer organization of early 1917. As the creation of the USAAS and Camp Crane indicated, however, the government was unwilling to subcontract its military services. Richard Norton, too, would soon learn about these attitudes employed by his government.

The daredevil sought no alteration of his work in the way the Inspector-General of the AFS did. Rather, the ambulancier remained true to the spirit of a Mid-Victorian elitism, cherishing personal vigor and individual effort, but certainly not large-scale organizational operations. To be sure, his patrician ego would later not object to see a high rank bestowed upon him in case his corps should be militarized.\(^ {69}\) He would readily accept an advanced rank that equaled what he perceived to be his experience and just patrician claim for leadership. At first, Norton hoped that a different recruiting policy, which targeted "men whom the fighting divisions could not use," would make a continuation of the private ambulance organization possible--an organization, furthermore, which retained the volunteer idea of previous years.\(^ {70}\) After the USAAS had been inaugurated, however, Norton hoped for much more: future leadership of possibly all ambulance sections organized by the Medical Department. Quite like Andrew, he had great expectations. He could do so because his associate’s name was Herman H. Harjes.

Since 1916, Norton had cooperated with Harjes in organizing ambulance units under the auspices of the American Red Cross. During the neutrality period, the American Red Cross had played a minor role in the relief work for France, including the ambulance work of Harjes’ and Norton’s sections. As official representative of the American Red Cross, Harjes had focused his efforts on the American Relief Clearing House, the central distributor of relief goods coming from the United States.\(^ {71}\) Harjes’ position in international monetary diplomacy (since the Morgan bank provided large loans to the French government) brought social esteem to the Norton-Harjes ambulance corps. The

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\(^{68}\) Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 19 October 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.


\(^{70}\) Richard to Eliot Norton, TLS, 31 December 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

French officials, for example, with whom Harjes had contact with respect to his sanitary work, were well aware of this. When the French military considered awarding the Legion of Honor to both Harjes and Andrew, Harjes found immediate supporters. Andrew, however, was marked as a "dissident," who was to be decorated "only if necessary."\(^\text{72}\)

Harjes represented an established American elite within the American colony in Paris. His father had been among the founders of the American Hospital there in 1907. His bank position put him into the ranks of the most influential Americans in the French capital. Harjes, too, was a patrician who could probably relate well to the archeologist Richard Norton. While the daredevil steered his Rolls-Royce ambulance to the front, the banker took care of their relation to the philanthropic American Red Cross, which, before 1917, was mainly an organization operated by people of inherited wealth and social position.\(^\text{73}\) When he had severed all ties to the American Ambulance Hospital in 1915, Herman Harjes had sneered at Andrew’s adolescent ambulanciers lured to the front by the danger and the excitement rather than the idea of "service."\(^\text{74}\) Now Harjes saw a possibility to reintegrate Andrew’s rapidly growing organization under the banner of the American Red Cross and the established American leadership in France.

Immediately after the declaration of war, Harjes proposed to Robert Bacon to jointly suggest that Congress provide the American Red Cross with sufficient funds to run the entire sanitary transport system with the French Army.\(^\text{75}\) This, obviously, would not merely include the small number of sections under the Norton-Harjes banner, but also Andrew’s much larger number of sections, and possibly the one hundred ambulance sections the Medical Department organized at Camp Crane. Under this scheme, Andrew would have faced public pressure to merge with the national, and now highly successful, organization of the American Red Cross.

In keeping with this plan, Herman Harjes offered fifty additional ambulance sections to the French government in May in his capacity as official representative of the American Red Cross in France.\(^\text{76}\) In a conversation with the French General Pétain, furthermore, Harjes was left with the impression that the French government "absolutely agreed that the organisation of Sanitary Service ought to be done by the Red Cross."\(^\text{77}\) At the end of May, Harjes believed that the hundred-million-dollar campaign and the new role of the Red Cross, backed by an efficient war council which President Wilson had appointed in May, would provide sufficient economic leverage to take command in

\(^{72}\) Files relating to the Legion of Honor for Andrew, Harjes, and Peyman, Box 16 N 2766, Documents relating to G. Q. G. Direction de l’Arrière, Direction des services automobiles (D.S.A.), Archives de l’Armée de Terre. My translation.


\(^{74}\) See chapter II.

\(^{75}\) Bacon to Andrew, cable, [April 1917], Box 7, Folder 71, AFS Archives.


\(^{77}\) “Committee Meeting,” TM, 14 May 1917, Box 3, Richard Norton Papers.
France. For the AFS to come under his command would provide "complete unity of action and [the] best possible results." In such a case, the Red Cross might provide the AFS with funds to continue its service with the French.

At first, these plans seemed to be backed by developments in the United States. Harjes perceived his ideas to be well supported because of the installation of a Red Cross War Council by President Woodrow Wilson in mid-May 1917. This new executive board, which effectively replaced the old Red Cross leadership of society dames and gentlemen, was headed by Henry P. Davison, a successful banker who worked—just like Harjes—for the Morgan bank. Under Davison’s leadership, the American Red Cross soon grew into a huge organization with the declared aim to coordinate all American relief work, including the work done by the more than one hundred private (and mostly small) American relief organizations in France. An editorial in the New York Times pointed out that the newly organized war council of the American Red Cross put this organization into a position to "coordinate without waste all relief activities. Let everybody understand just what is meant," the paper explained. "All organizations of war relief are to coordinate their work with that of the Red Cross." As Sleeper stated in a cable to Andrew, the "President and others here [are] too harassed to tolerate individualism." At a time when the public measured institutions of any size and purpose against the standard of efficiency, the Red Cross became the centralizing force looming over American relief organizations in France, and the one official and national American organization which could actually point to staff and leadership on French soil. This staff, in May 1917, had Herman Harjes at its helm.

Thus, when an American Red Cross Commission arrived in Paris to streamline relief work and coordinate sanitary operations in preparation for the American troops, Herman Harjes and Richard Norton were hopeful that the extension of their service would materialize. The commission, after all, was despatched by the president of the Red Cross war council, Henry P. Davison. Immediately after the arrival of the commission in mid-June, Norton wrote to a staff member in London that the commission seemed to favor "our old schemes." "Harjes tells me I shall probably be given charge of all the Red Cross Ambulances working on the French front," Norton wrote.

In fact, however, Norton’s and Harjes’ plans came to an abrupt halt. As Norton recalled later, "the Red Cross [Commission] arrived full of money and American business point of view and have got everybody in their line of work by the ears." Headed by Major Grayson M. P. Murphy, the commission arrived in Paris on June 13. About two weeks

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78 “Committee Meeting,” TM, 28 May 1917, Box 3, Richard Norton Papers. $250,000 had been sent to Harjes “as an advance.”
79 Cable in Box 4, Richard Norton Papers. Even though the cable does not indicate who wrote it, it was sent from the American Relief Clearing House, of which Harjes was president. It was sent to New York.
81 Sleeper to Andrew, cable, n.d., Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
thereafter, General John G. Pershing put Murphy and the Red Cross work in France under his command. When the militarized Red Cross formally took over Richard Norton’s ambulance section (among others which had been close to the American Red Cross), Norton, against his wishes, found himself under military control. Harjes, too, felt disappointed that his plans for an independent ambulance service under his (not the military’s) command did not materialize. "Harjes is . . . slightly put out, personally," Norton wrote shortly thereafter, "because it seems as though the men who had been working in his firm in America, Davison and others, had disregarded all his advice and were following the advice of the Andrew ‘clique.’" As it turned out, the commission’s "business point of view" which upheld efficiency and bureaucracy as modern tools of large-scale organization clashed with Harjes’ and Norton’s claim for leadership by established patricians.

Shortly after the Red Cross Commission had settled in Paris hotels, the army followed in its footsteps. In late June, General John G. Pershing had arrived in Paris to arrange and prepare the arrival of the American troops slowly put together in the United States. Since May, both Harjes and Andrew had sought to expand their ambulance services with the French Army. Andrew had turned his AAFS into the large operation of the AFS; and Harjes had hoped for a positive fallout from his social esteem and his philanthropic connections. While Pershing had put the Harjes-Norton sections under the direction of the military, it was not decided who would take command of the USAAS sections then assembled in a small Pennsylvanian town. In fact, not much seemed clear at all. The American government had still not made any decision regarding the militarization of the AFS nor put forward details about the Harjes-Norton sections.

The only decision which had been made by late June 1917 was that Norton and Harjes’ sections would henceforth become part of the military. Accordingly, Harjes, Norton, and Andrew all desired militarization under their own terms. In the light of the Medical Department’s decision to operate its own ambulance service, it must have seemed crucial to them to at least retain the identity and independence of their ambulance services if those were to be militarized. If possible, they might have been ready to accept any better deal than that. Thus, what might seem as a scramble for the best job, involved much more than a personal tug-of-war among long-standing rivals. The volunteer ambulance services understood militarization as their country’s possibility to recompense them for their long-standing sacrifice for the right cause. Both Norton and Andrew drew their expectations from their ideals of individual enterprise and their liberal ideology. Both had successfully organized and operated ambulance services with the French Army for several years in close proximity to belligerency. Now, they felt, their government could

show appreciation of their work by granting them a semi-independent status for their organizations while simultaneously conferring military titles upon them.

Accordingly, Andrew submitted a cable to Pershing’s staff by Sleeper in which his American partner urged him to ask for the position of Lieutenant Colonel, “as you will soon have more than eighteen hundred men [all AFS volunteers] under your command.”88 In this way, Andrew had downscaled his expectations from running all ambulance sections with the French Army to retaining control over his own men while simultaneously holding a commission that would integrate him into the military. Thus, having abandoned the hope for central command, the Inspector-General aimed at keeping his own organization distinct from the military body. In this discussion, however, Pershing probably argued in favor of one centralized ambulance organization. This organization, from the military perspective, could only be the Medical Department’s USAAS.

Indeed, Pershing saw no reason to concede to Andrew’s plans for a high-ranking commission. Nine days later, on July 11, Pershing cabled to Washington that the "coordination [of the] various American services in France [was] proceeding satisfactorily, with exception of [the] American Field Service. . . . [The] personal conduct of individuals [in] these services [are] subject to criticism. . . . In order to bring this organization under control," the cable contained the proposal of the "appointment of Richard Norton and A. Pyatt Andrews [sic] as Captains," not Lieutenant Colonels.89 According to the War Department’s plan, the USAAS was to feature one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, eight Majors, and thirty-two Captains. A Major commanded twenty sections, and a Captain was to be in charge of five.90 In Pershing’s view, both Norton and Andrew were to be minor figures in their militarized ambulance services.

The Secretary of War responded promptly. On July 15, Pershing received his announcement that Colonel Jefferson R. Kean was en route to France to take charge of the ambulance sections serving with the French Army.91 Andrew and Harjes had hoped for important positions in the military; now Colonel Kean, when he arrived in Paris, was to have all options with regard to organizations of the ambulance services. He embarked for France to put two services under one command which had previously engaged in sometimes hostile competition.

In August 1917, Colonel Kean brought with him the blueprint and details of the USAAS under the command of the American Army. As part of these plans, Kean offered both the American Volunteer-Motor Ambulance Corps and the AFS to become part of the USAAS. Within the USAAS, the AFS leaders as well as Norton were offered to keep control of their former units, despite a new, American, numbering system. While all this seemed according to Andrew’s and Norton’s wishes, the crux was the decision of how to

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88Sleeper to Andrew, cable, received 2 July 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.
89[Pershing] to Adjutant General, TL (cable), 11 July 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.
90Smuckers, USAAS History, 11.
91McCain to Pershing, cable, 15 July 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.
fit these two ambulanciers into the new command hierarchy. Here, both Andrew and Norton were offered the rank of Majors. Thus, even this proposal, while upgraded from Pershing’s earlier version, would make Andrew and Norton minor figures under Kean, who was to commandeer the USAAS and its more than one hundred sections. Ironically, Colonel Kean requested these promotions "in order that full use may be made of their services in the reorganization."92 That their "service" and support would be forthcoming under the new directorate, however, was anything but clear.

Of Danger and Duty

Norton and Andrew’s decision to accept or abandon the military took place at a time when the meaning of ambulancing radically changed. Before the entry of the United States into the war, ambulancing stood for individual sacrifice and heroism, an aspect of this work both Andrew and Norton had come to cherish. During American neutrality, upper-middle class sons were admired in both America and France as they volunteered for steering their "flivvers" in the firing zone. The club-atmosphere of both the Norton-Harjes sections and the AAFS had been a distinct aspect of their work. During the summer of 1917 all this changed.

As the American military began to recruit men for combat in the trenches and other services much more dangerous than steering ambulances behind them, sacrifice now became attached to suddenly more rewarding modes of military service. "What Col. Kean has not realized and I dare say many others have not either, but what is perfectly true," Norton bitterly wrote to his brother, "is that the young men in the Ambulance Service will be regarded by the French as 'embusqués' [shirkers]."93 In the United States, driving an ambulance lost much of its heroic connotations as other branches of service became available to men of military age. Theodore Roosevelt, once supporter of the volunteer ambulanciers and their mission to save America’s soul, now argued that ambulancing belonged to the kind of service not suitable "for the strong man who could take the first line trenches." In a speech on the fourth of July, he demanded: "‘Let the old men or those who are unable to meet the physical requirements of the army--or the women--do that work. We want every man in the fight!’"94

Roosevelt’s attack on the integrity of ambulanciers, predictably, demanded a response. Major E. E. Persons, who was in charge of the USAAS Camp Crane in Allen-town, defended ambulancing by pointing to the continuation of qualities cherished by the old volunteers. "These young men have chosen the ambulance service after a very much closer examination into its requirements than Colonel Roosevelt has apparently made," Persons argued, "and with the knowledge that the casualties in this service have thus far been greater than in any of the fighting services except the field artillery and the aerona-

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tic service." The field service organized by the Medical Department, in other words, claimed to provide a "baptism of fire" which the earlier volunteer organizations had cherished. This was easy to do in 1917, long before American troops had made their first showing on the French front.

Despite these defensive arguments, however, the connotations of danger were no longer attached to ambulanceing along the front. Other services, providing dangerous and rewarding involvement in the war, now outstripped the ambulance services. It was the Seventh-Day Adventists, men of a religious group whose teachings forbade combat, but did not forbid military service, not the eager and adventurous Ivy League college students, who increasingly "expressed their willingness to do their part in the Field Ambulance and Field Hospital Services." What once was a testing ground under shelling for young college students, now turned towards the purely humanitarian and noncombatant aspects implicit in its work. The field service had carried with it notions of war and danger. Now it increasingly stood for peaceful relief work. "We are noncombatants," the Adventists pointed out in recognition of what it meant to drive an ambulance rather than carry a gun, "we are not cowards."96

Besides the altered meaning of ambulanceing behind the trenches, however, it was the disruption of the idea of the volunteer which was felt most acutely by those involved. To see himself on the same level with enlisted men and conscripts contradicted many a volunteer's sense of elitism and heroic adventure, initiated by the individual, and promising personal redemption for sacrifice. Richard Norton especially felt that a different kind of driver would now appear behind the trenches. In consideration of recruiting "mere privates" by the USAAS, he wrote to his brother that "This fact alone will make many of the men unready to go on with the work, because while they like to do it when working with the class of men you are getting for us, they will not want to be hurled in with the type sent from Allantown [sic]."97 Reflecting on the kind of college men going to France between before 1917, one observer wrote shortly after the war, "The college men of America never showed themselves more heroic than in services thus rendered." This service "was not supported by love of America in the degree which the later services inspired."98 By early summer 1917, patriotism had replaced the lure of individual adventure as a motivation for many students to join the war in France.

In this atmosphere, both Andrew and Norton shared the disenchanting experience of witnessing their old volunteer idea be transformed. They saw a changing perception of what it meant to drive an ambulance. If they accepted militarization, their men were no longer to be volunteers, but enlisted army personnel. "All Drivers Who Serve in France Must Enlist in Hospital Corps," the New York Times announced in August 1917. "Henceforth any one who wants to drive an ambulance must enlist as an ordinary private in the hospital corps, by application to the Surgeon General in Washington," the paper

95Ibid.
98Thwing, American Colleges, 21.
told its readers. Thus, even while Andrew’s and Norton’s ambulances still fetched wounded from the trenches during the summer of 1917, the very idea of their work was altered. It influenced their decisions to join or abandon the military.

"Hook, Bait, and Sinker"

During the period of American neutrality, both A. Piatt Andrew and Richard Norton had employed ideas particular to an Eastern elite in their voluntary effort to uphold cultural values they regarded as being intertwined with the cause of the French against the "Hun." They had run their ambulance services upon the basis of liberal ideals they had brought with them from New England. The individual’s responsibility and their own "service" were important aspects of their work along the front in France.

Both, furthermore, had felt that their own country erred in not taking up arms on behalf of the cause they supported with their ambulance services. Andrew even organized an elaborate public relations campaign which brought the Allied cause to the movie theaters of an American public. Thus, while Andrew and Norton adhered to liberal ideas, they were also patriots in the sense that they considered their own social class as providing a natural leadership for the American republic. As the vanguard of volunteers in France, furthermore, they felt truly qualified to bring their experience into positions and ranks of responsibility and prestige.

The American government, however, cut these expectations short. If they desired to be acknowledged by the American military, and thus by their own government, they would have to agree to its terms. If they chose to remain outside this organization, they could equally do so, but remain without any influence nor command. Clearly, Andrew and Norton now had to choose between subordination under a military machine and thus adhere to ideas of patriotism as well as the cause they had advocated for two years; or they could choose to uphold the liberal individualism they cherished and thus remain outside of these national structures of command and patriotism. This was a crucial choice. As Norton remembered it later, "We had either to swallow the scheme hook, bait and sinker, or get out." In this complex situation, patriotism was tied to humiliation of status; and liberal individualism to a neglect of the nationalism they had advocated during the preceding years. For both men, these clashing values bequeathed them with a most difficult decision; and it was real. No one could force Norton or Andrew to become part of the military. "The Surgeon General cannot force you to be militarized," Eliot Norton pointed out to his brother. "He can only invite you to be." Technically, the military could only force men of draft age to comply with its wishes. In 1917, however, Norton was forty-five, and Andrew forty-four. Thus both men were ineligible for draft and could freely choose to accept or abandon the military.

In keeping with his staunchly individualistic ideas, Richard Norton, the daredevil and patrician, was unwilling to accept the offered rank. "We had a talk yesterday after-

noon with Colonel Kean," he wrote to his office staff in London in late August, "the result of which is that I and all the men in the office intend to resign and give up the work."\textsuperscript{102} In this letter, Norton capitalized "Volunteer," the key idea around which his motivation evolved. The "whole type of ambulance driver will be changed," he argued. To him, militarization meant the end of a spirit of "noblesse oblige," the end of a heroic reward that resulted from the personal devotion to sacrifice. Among the options offered to him, he clearly opted for the preservation of his ideals of volunteerism and personal "service," the backbones of his patrician background.

Old rivalries and a personal sense of honor also contributed to Norton’s decision. He should be in charge, he felt, without another Major, and former rival, equal to him.\textsuperscript{103} Initially, Norton had claimed authority within this new structure. In July, he later wrote, he had thought that the "Surgeon General was making up a general scheme which Colonel Kean would propose and change or modify in accordance with advice we could give him based on our three years experience."\textsuperscript{104} Now that Norton realized that no one asked him about his opinions, he decided against offering his experience to the USAAS.

At the same time, however, he now had to stay clear from charges of unpatriotic behavior. "My resignation from the service," he pointed out in an interview, "must in no way be taken to mean that I object to the ambulance service being taken over by the United States Army." He pointed out that "I heartily approve of the militarization of the service . . . Ever since America came into the war, I had hoped that we would be militarized, though not so strictly so as now seems necessary."\textsuperscript{105} In late August 1917, Richard Norton walked a tight rope between his own patrician ideals and being accused of abandoning his country.

Norton was not repelled by the idea of a strong federal military apparatus taking over his sections. Rather, the decision not to continue as a Major next to Andrew indicated his consternation over the rejection of his individual qualities. Norton did not reject the military hierarchy as such; he rejected his own subordination and loss of status within it. "I was offered a commission as major and the same rank was given to Stelle, a man who had been in our office two months as assistant . . . who by reputation, character + experience was utterly unfit to be an officer," Norton wrote to his brother. "Does this sort of thing give you the desire to enter that branch of the army?"\textsuperscript{106} Because he was concerned about his personal status rather than the idea of subordination in the abstract, Norton did not see beyond his own role in the new American war machine. "Richard’s lack of imagination of anybody else’s point of view than his own," Eliot Norton later scribbled on one of his brother’s letters in a different context, "is a curious feature of his character."\textsuperscript{107} The rank of a Major, and especially the rank of a Major equal to his rival An-

\textsuperscript{102}Richard Norton to [Anderson], TL, 25 August 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.

\textsuperscript{103}Richard Norton to Morrison, TL, 25 August 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

\textsuperscript{104}Richard Norton to Eliot Norton, TLS, 31 December 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

\textsuperscript{105}New York Herald (Paris), 26 August 1917.

\textsuperscript{106}Richard Norton to Eliot Norton, ALS, 21 November 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

drew, challenged Norton’s understanding of himself as belonging to an elite ready to conduct the affairs of his country in an individual and independent way.

But watching the volunteer aspect stripped from his work was more devastating than any other aspect of militarization for Richard Norton. After he had turned down his commission, Norton agreed to help Kean during the period of transition of his sections to the USAAS. The ambulancier, however, worked against Kean’s efforts to enlist his men, which was crucial to guaranteeing uninterrupted service with the French Army. When Colonel Kean presented General Pershing with a letter Norton had written to his sections, Pershing "raised a most awful row because of a sentence in which I said of the volunteer, 'he will have to make up his mind for himself [whether he should enlist] but he should clearly understand . . . [that if he enlisted he would become] a mere private.'" Pershing, predictably, considered Norton’s reference to enlisted men as "mere privates" an insult to the American Army.108 In reply, the gentleman ambulancier pointed out to the military commander that "The type of man who came to us was most spiritually alive to the needs of the hour. In a large measure they were men of superior education."109 The men trained at Allentown, he implied, would not be able to provide the same spiritual quality. In the fall of 1917, Norton stubbornly defended individual enterprise and initiative against patriotism, and its call for unified action.

Andrew, too, considered turning down the commission offered to him by Kean and the Medical Department. Unlike Norton, however, the organizer who had merged his liberal ideas with organizational skill and built a volunteer organization of 2,500 men, ultimately accepted the rank of a Major. "I am relieved beyond measure to hear," Sleeper wrote to Andrew, "that you have accepted your commission. I can not help feeling--although I sympathize with your hesitancy--that it would be much more distinguished and admirable if you stay with your men. In spite of the justice of your viewpoint," Sleeper continued, "the fact remains that it is more attractive to play the game through, no matter what it involves." Thus, the administrator chose nationalism and patriotic duty over the liberal ideas that characterized much of his earlier work. Having made this decision, Major Andrew could now blame Norton for not adhering to the nation’s call of service. As Sleeper put it, Norton’s "having fallen down and behaved so disagreeably," made accepting the commission worth the while even more.110

To have someone else as the overall commander must have been a disheartening prospect for Andrew. As Andrew had pondered whether he would put on the army’s uniform, his "friend" and the official head of his organization, Robert Bacon, probably appealed to the Inspector-General’s sense of duty to his country. To this preparedness-advocate, who had been director of the National Defense League since 1916, the AFS was part of a larger cause he had fought for during the preceding years: the unifying and socially integrating function of military preparedness and American intervention. Now, as member of Pershing’s staff, this staunch conservative "was invaluable in smoothing over the natural friction in receiving into the Military Service the many American organi-

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109Richard Norton to [Pershing], TL, [10 October 1917], Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.
110Sleeper to Andrew, TL, 15 November 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
zations and enthusiastic war workers," a high officer later remembered.\textsuperscript{111} In 1916, Andrew had not been able to sever completely his connections to the American Ambulance Hospital. As militarization got underway one year later, hospital president and AFS treasurer Robert Bacon matched Andrew’s individual aspirations with the call of patriotism and national service.

Obviously, Andrew, too, felt that his abilities were neglected by the new men in charge. After militarization, Andrew criticized Kean and the new organization from the perspective of the experienced administrator. Andrew pointed his finger at issues such as the lack of spare parts and the inefficient transportation and storage of ambulance cars from the French ports to Paris.\textsuperscript{112} The cars sent for the USAAS, he argued, were poorly constructed. "They are shorter, narrower, and lower than ours with very weak frame work and lacking most of the little devices which our experience of these last three years have proved convenient and necessary. French army officials," he pointed out, "are disturbed at the prospect of having to use such cars . . ."\textsuperscript{113} Unlike Norton, Andrew stressed not so much the change in the type of ambulance driver that would parallel militarization, but rather failures of efficient organization. In this way, the new Major focused on issues that were closer to his experience as large-scale organizer and administrator. Here, however, he felt that he held but a subordinate position. "It must indeed be almost overwhelming," Sleeper wrote to his friend, "to have to face, impotently, such a situation--after you have been able, for more than two years, to govern efficiently and to fulfill quickly whatever need the French Army has expressed."\textsuperscript{114} Andrew’s understanding of efficiency left him disgusted with his superiors, and especially Colonel Kean.\textsuperscript{115}

Andrew’s criticism of the organizational structure of the American, in contrast with the French, army proved another case in point. While the French Army had organized his sections with the Automobile Service of the French Army, he blamed the United States Army for keeping his service under the control of the Medical Department. "Surgical and medical training had . . . no part to play in the ambulance service in France," he argued.\textsuperscript{116} Writing these lines, Andrew must have also had in mind that his transport sections came under the control of the army’s Quartermaster Department, not the USAAS. Andrew’s service had been created within the context of the French military effort. He now blamed the American military for not realizing its efficiency in that context.

Despite his criticism, however, Andrew accepted the new rules. Indeed, the new rules in part represented ideas he himself had employed earlier that year. Upon the recommendation of General Doumenc in April, Andrew had vigorously organized camion

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  \item \textsuperscript{111} Brigadier-General Frank McCoy to Mrs. Bacon, 15 October 1920, in Scott, Robert Bacon: Life and Letters, 310-11.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} For Andrew’s complaints about logistical matters, see Folder “Historical Data USAAS, September-December 1917,” Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Andrew to Robert W. Bliss, 6 October 1917, Box 61, Folder 601 A, AFS Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Sleeper Andrew, TL, 4 December 1917, Box 7, Folder 71-B, AFS Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Andrew to his parents, 5 October 1917, Andrew Gray Collection.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} American Field Service, Friends of France: The Field Service of the American Ambulance described by its Members (Privately Printed: New York, 1916), 28-29.
\end{itemize}
sections outside civilian protection by the Geneva Convention and in close proximity to combat operations. While retaining the concept of the volunteer, Andrew had thus demonstrated that he was ready to change the format of his service. As his men arrived in 21 rue Raynouard, he had assigned them to either ambulance or transport work, according to his needs. Unlike Norton, whose ambulanciers drove any kind of car, many times their own, through the mud along the trenches, Andrew (with exceptions) had used the standardized Ford. In this way, his mechanics could keep spare parts in stock, and quickly send them to the sections if need be. Now the USAAS used the same car Andrew had used, and copied many of its features. While the army, of course, at the onset of its war effort still struggled with the details of mobilization, it shared Andrew’s appreciation for efficiency, and vice-versa.

Just like Kean, furthermore, Andrew wanted to provide the French with an uninterrupted ambulance service. Because Andrew’s aims coincided with Kean’s, Major Andrew did not work against the Colonel’s recruiting efforts. "We are doing all we can to induce our men to enlist," he wrote, "and so to hand over the service intact and with as little bouleversement as possible." Andrew, furthermore, was not happy when his volunteers departed for other branches. By trying to keep them within the ranks of the USAAS he sought to retain some of the identity of the old AAFS within the new organization. The Chicago Tribune even blamed him for giving his men dishonorable discharges if they chose to leave the ambulance service before the end of their six-month assignment. Despite these accusations, however, Andrew mostly complied with the new necessity to let his men go into aviation, artillery, and other branches. The one-time founder of the field service accepted the forces that radically changed the context of his volunteer ambulance organization.

Norton, on the other hand, remained hostile to Kean, the military, and any effort to enlist his men. After statements about Norton’s attitude had appeared in the press, Colonel Kean felt forced to state in the New York Herald (Paris) that the Norton-Harjes Corps was not disbanded, and that Norton’s statement was "calculated to produce an effect which is hardly favorable to the carrying out of the wishes of the Governments of France and of the United States." Norton, in other words, was publicly accused of his lack of patriotism and sense of civic duty. Both terms now had replaced the volunteer ethos of earlier days, and became the standard against which the patrician found himself measured. Kean was concerned that Norton used his position as "a father and mother, as well as guide philosopher and friend of the volunteers" (as Norton himself had once described it) to obstruct the Colonel’s efforts. The Colonel, most of all, desired to have the volunteers enlist not in aviation or other branches of the army or navy but in the

117 Andrew to Robert Bliss, 6 October 1917, Folder 608 A, AFS Archives.
118 Chicago Tribune, Galatti Scrapbook, AFS Archives.
119 See Box 2, Folder 17, AFS Archives, for correspondence on the transfer of volunteers to other branches of the army.
120 New York Herald (Paris), [beginning of September 1917], in Galatti Scrapbook, Box 68, AFS Archives.
121 Acting Chairman of the American Red Cross, Wadsworth, to Richard Norton, TLS, 14 September 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.
USAAS. In a way, Kean thus employed considerations similar to the ones Andrew had used during the neutrality period when the Colonel noted the importance of the service for the French.\(^{122}\) Norton’s refusal to accept a commission, Kean argued, "is rather discouraging to the men of the sections."\(^{123}\) By hindering the process of enlistment, Norton endangered the French war effort. Andrew’s eagerness to serve the French made him Kean’s ally against Norton. Norton, who had always been cynical when it came to his rival, now proposed that Kean had "put himself into Andrew’s hands."\(^{124}\) Indeed, the patrician could not distinguish between Kean’s military considerations and Andrew’s militarism.

"The End of Our Freedom"

In the end, however, militarization was completed despite the reluctance of many old volunteers. And it was not Norton who was in charge, but men like Colonel Kean and Major Andrew. Norton’s one-time partner Harjes found himself out of his position as representative of the American Red Cross in France and into a liaison function between Pershing and French authorities. Within the Red Cross, his business partner Davison set the pace to efficiency and big operations which put Harjes out of step with this new kind of philanthropy. Yet Major Harjes accepted the new hierarchy and disclaimed any friendly relations with his one-time associate Richard Norton. In September Harjes wrote that Norton’s critical letter to his sections had his "strongest possible disapproval."\(^{125}\) Thus Norton was abandoned when Harjes aligned himself with Pershing.

With Norton faded an attitude that aimed to preserve a spirit of volunteering which was incapable of adapting to a loss of status within the superimposed hierarchy of the military. Norton failed to convince the representatives of the federal government and military of his own liberal ideas and assumptions about an educated bourgeoisie. His ideas of individualism and personal sacrifice, not for an organized body, but for oneself, were halted by a new force suddenly turned against him. "I do most absolutely deny that because we are at war we ought absolutely to give up the use of our individual intelligence and bow to any decision made by Government authority as though it was made with divine sanction," he had argued.\(^{126}\) If Norton stood for the ideology of a larger group of Americans--an Eastern aristocracy with strong beliefs in their social authority as an educated elite--then Norton’s rejection of his commission represented both the stubborn-

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\(^{122}\) J. R. Kean to Major General W. C. Gorgas, TL, 25 August 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives. The USAAS, he argued, now provided one fourth of the ambulance work for the French army.

\(^{123}\) J. R. Kean to Colonel Frank Parker, TL, 28 August 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.

\(^{124}\) Richard Norton to Miss E. G. Norton, TL, 7 November 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

\(^{125}\) Major Harjes, American Military Mission, Liaison Group, to Ducassi, TLS, 28 September 1917, Box 2, Richard Norton Papers.

ness of these ideas and their failure to challenge the suddenly enriched powers of the national government in World War I.

In 1914, A. Piatt Andrew had left the United States after his career had come to a halt. In France, he had found the turf to employ his ideas of efficiency and elitism, blend them with nineteenth-century values of heroic sacrifice, tie them to the French cause, and build his field ambulance service on this foundation. He was proud of his success. As the American Army followed him across the Atlantic three years later, however, he chose not to remain outside of its power structures. In 1917, it seemed, Andrew felt relieved officially to reenter the ranks of American society. He could compromise with the new tone set by the military because he shared some of its ideas. Indeed, efficiency and management were familiar terms to the one-time administrator. The former Vice-Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the Mint could bring his skill as economist and administrator into the army. In this way, he joined the rank-and-file of Henry P. Davison, who, fittingly, was a personal friend from Andrew’s days on the Aldrich commission and stood for the gospel of efficiency now being sung from the high towers of the war managers.

As Andrew and Norton show, World War I helped metamorphose the individual’s expectation of governmental responsibility. Both Andrew’s incorporation and Norton’s rebellion are evidence for the reality of these transformations. Norton argued that “I do not think there will be many individuals who will see the necessity of giving [ambulance] cars to the Army.” He was unable to apprehend a changing role of the American government in wartime which would rely on patriotism, war bonds, and taxes to raise the funds for the USAAS. One-time private philanthropists would now indeed donate their money to governmental institutions.

Militarization seemed inevitable to both Andrew and Norton. As mobilization got underway and the call of patriotism set the tone for the home front, Andrew and Norton saw the possibilities for continuation of a private ambulance organization disappear. "The take-over by the Army is an inevitable step . . . ," Andrew bitterly wrote to his parents, "given . . . the fact that we have now to compete with the army, which has unlimited authority and money and can draw one after another of our men away by inducement and command." While these sentences still reveal a touch of naiveté regarding the centralizing forces in the United States--Who would consider "competing" with the American Army today?--Andrew thus indicated the informal pressures and changing individual expectations as a unification of all segments of war work both in and behind the trenches was underway. Also, Andrew here displayed his paradoxical situation. He had always been dedicated to the nation and hence by extension to the military and had hoped from the beginning of his work in 1915 that his own county’s forces appear in France. Now that the latter had arrived in France, the Major’s liberal ideals of culture and elitist guidance gave way before the marching troops of his own country.

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127 Richard Norton to [Anderson], TL, 25 August 1917, Box 4345, Early History of the United States Army Ambulance Service, World War I Organization Records Medical Department, National Archives.

128 Andrew to his parents, 1 September 1917, Andrew Gray Collection.
Thus, in 1917, Richard Norton and A. Piatt Andrew made their choice for and against the terms of militarization of their ambulance services, and with their choice they indicated a larger transformation. They had set out for France to defend nineteenth-century values they understood to revolve around the call of "noblesse oblige." They found their elitism certified in their heroic work along the trenches, frequently portrayed in the rhetoric of knights crusading for the good cause of the Allies. In France, they found an arena in which to defend these values from the onslaughts of a quickly modernizing world in which "noblesse oblige," heroic sacrifice, and liberal ideals were increasingly misplaced and antiquated notions. As their ambulance knights fetched the wounded from the trenches, the trench warfare and its machine-like killing ironically symbolized the extent to which the a modern and efficient thinking was deteriorating their own ideals at their feet.

That Andrew, and not Norton, accepted the new rules of the military was significant. To his assignment as Inspector-General of the AAFS, Andrew had brought the basic equipment needed to operate in a modernized world. In contrast, Norton’s training in art history and liberal individualism made him not merely a weak organizer, but one who had no intentions of running a large scale operation. Andrew, on the other hand, understood that in a new age, success was not based on the support of individuals, but on the support of a mass culture. To that end, he skillfully employed modern techniques such as film.

In 1917, militarization tested Andrew’s and Norton’s conceptual frameworks. In this test, Andrew’s toolbox proved to be better equipped than Norton’s to adjust to hierarchical thinking and subordination. The Major swallowed his pride and kept on going, while Norton got out. "I have wanted the step to come for some time," Andrew wrote home, "but of course, it means the end of the Field Service as such;--the end of our freedom and distinction,--and we naturally feel sorry on that account."129 To both Andrew and Norton, militarization was a disenchanting experience. Yet Andrew's ideas and attitudes, stripped of their knightly prose, would survive into the twenties.

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129Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
EPILOGUE

With his monocle "gleaming in his eye," Richard Norton presented his drivers with a melancholic farewell: "'As gentlemen volunteers you enlisted in this service and as gentlemen volunteers I bid you farewell.'"1 After handing over business to Kean, the daredevil left the ambulance service never to return. Before he did so, he wrote to his brother that his "chief desire is to help these boys who came over with perfectly clear ideas . . . to get out of a Service [sic] which is distasteful to them and enter into other positions where their qualities will show."2 Norton thus remained loyal to his volunteers. In the fall of 1917, it seemed for a short while as if he would become commander of all those American Red Cross ambulance sections which were then going to Italy.3 As this plan came to nothing, Norton announced that he would retire.4 He remained in Paris as a civilian.

Andrew, on the other hand, remained the leader of those volunteers who chose to remain ambulanciers under the new rules. "It took a few days, too, to get used to the cowboy hat General Pershing insists upon," Major Andrew wrote to his parents in November 1917.5 With reservations, the one-time Inspector-General adjusted to the new ways of military life. He remained in charge of those ambulance sections carried over from the old AFS and was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in July 1918.6 Nevertheless, for him and his volunteers, the transition from the AFS to the modes and regulations of the USAAS was not always easy to negotiate. Indeed, many of the volunteers decided that a militarized ambulance service was not for them at all. Just like Andrew and Norton, each of them made their choice whether to remain with the ambulance service, join some other branch of the fighting forces, or get out.

In August and September 1917 it was all but clear that Andrew’s and Norton’s ambulance drivers would comply with Kean’s wishes to have an unobstructed transformation to military command. Indeed, when Kean, Andrew, and Norton fixed the details of militarization, the Colonel expected not more than fifty percent of the volunteers to enlist in the USAAS.7 Initially, it looked as if the campaign would be more successful. Eighty percent of the oldest AFS section, S.S.U. 1, joined military ranks at the end of

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5Andrew to his parents, 5 November 1917, Andrew Gray collection.
6Kean to Andrew, TL, 27 July 1918, Box 61, Folder 611, AFS Archives.
August. In September, however, after one-third of the sections had been visited by Kean’s recruiters, only 209 out of 417 men had enlisted (twenty men had been rejected by the recruiters). By October, Colonel Kean’s initial estimate was met. Only about fifty percent of AFS volunteers had enlisted. Twenty-five out of the forty-nine initially planned sections were organized with old volunteers. Altogether, only about five hundred men enlisted in the USAAS, most of whom had driven Fords for the AFS. In August, one of Norton’s staff members had asserted that unless the daredevil remained in command, "they won’t see our tails for dust." In keeping with their leader’s ideals, only a few Norton men joined.

Many volunteers were eager to become part of the USAAS, but they were not necessarily eager to do so on Kean’s terms. When Kean’s recruiters toured the sections many men were reluctant to enlist because they did not see a bright military career ahead. Obviously in ignorance about the consequences, Kean told Norton’s ambulanciers that he could not guarantee their lieutenancies as these were given to men from the United States first. In the absence of prospective advancement in ranks, many drivers returned to the States. Some were "of the opinion that their experience and the fact that they have been working for 5 cents [Francs] a day and paying all their expenses entitled them to commissions." In this way, many ambulance drivers preserved their sense of elitism in a way similar to the way Norton was to do. During the neutrality period, they had been the vanguard of volunteers; now, some claimed, "those at home with no real war experience receive commissions and honors." With Richard Norton a minority of drivers felt that their qualities had not been duly recognized. To them, men enlisting at home seemed to get commissions they had earned. Especially those who would enlist with the USAAS, however, would be able to tell how ambulancing changed between the spring and the summer of 1917. In previous years, Andrew, Norton, and their knights had defended voluntary idealism in their Fords and Rolls-Royces. But while the knightly rhetoric of earlier days was still propagated, it was but stale rhetoric.

Instead, at the Medical Department’s Camp Crane at Allentown, five thousand recruits sang "Perhaps the most popular song" in their camp:

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9New York Herald, [mid-September 1917], in Galatti Scrapbook, box 68, AFS Archives.
10New York Herald, 10 October 1917.
11Chief Accountant, Section Sanitaires, WRM/AVR, to Morrison, 20 August 1917, Box 1, Richard Norton Papers.
12Ireland, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, 8:231. 462 out of 2,295 AAFS ambulance drivers (excluding transport drivers) joined the USAAS. See American Field Service, History, 3:447-516.
Don’t talk about the Infantry
   Or Cavalry to me.
Don’t blow about your Flying Squad
   Or Coast Artillery.
The finest bunch of men that ever
   Served on land or sea
Is the Ambulance, the Ambulance
   The U.S.A.A.C.!!

In a unison voice, these ambulanciers denied that they were cowards and defensively agreed that they were the "finest bunch of men." "The Standing Retreat, which is placed on the Order of the Day at 5:15 P. M., is most impressive," the New York Times observed at Camp Crane. "Five thousand clean-cut young chaps stand at strictest attention while the flag for which they are willing to give their lives flutters and comes down." What in previous years had been an undertaking for a select few now became but part of a vast military machine. The advent of the American Army in France replaced the heroic service and sacrifice of the AAFS and Norton-Harjes sections with "duty for duty’s sake."

Indeed, for many volunteers who remained with the ambulance service and in the USAAS, the militarization of their sections was a bitter experience. In his section, he had been the commanding officer and treated with respect by the French, one volunteer wrote to his Harvard fellows at home. "But in the American army a lieutenant was by definition a kid, and in treatment a goat. . . . There were moments when I think I could almost understand a Bolshevik."

Those drivers who chose not to remain in the army at all faced official and unofficial pressure to sign up for the fighting units. After Norton’s men heeded their chief’s advice, showed reluctance to join the USAAS, and chose to visit Paris instead, the conservative Herald told them that they would be given "another chance to redeem their service" by enlisting immediately. By the end of November, however, American authorities had lost patience with idle Ivy Leaguers "loitering about Paris." The American military rounded up more than two hundred former ambulance volunteers who still wore their ambulance uniforms and gave them the choice to either enlist in active service, or be sent back to the United States "where they could be dealt with as the circumstances warranted." What had began as an voluntary adventure for "sterling youths" thus turned

16New York Times, 29 July 1917, sec. 4, p. 2. The names USAAC (for United States Army Ambulance Corps) and USAAS (United States Army Ambulance Service) were used interchangeably.
17Ibid.
18Untitled manuscript, TMs, Folder 4345, Box "World War I Organization Records, Medical Department," National Archives, Washington D.C. Also see The Radiator, 25 December 1918, 3.
into a not so glorious end as ambulanciers faced the tough arm of the military authorities. Within the USAAS, Andrew’s former volunteers now tried to retain some of the good old days of voluntary ambulancing by stressing that they had been the elite of first Americans in the firing lines. The essential tool for retaining their identity became the weekly American Field Service Bulletin, which began publication on 4 July 1917 and continued into the twenties. From the headquarters of the former AAFS, 21 rue Raynouard former driver John McFadden sent the Bulletin to all former AAFS volunteers. Here, they found a place to uphold an elitist "esprit de corps," best reflected in the poetry, which sometimes filled the entire publication.

La Belle France

Thou shalt be born anew O! France
When thoughts of man’s diviner self advance,
When free from carnage, war and pain
Thy nation’s spirit shall arise again.
A band of poets, statesmen, seers,
Shall honor thee O! France thru coming years.22

Many former volunteers now felt themselves to be representatives of high culture among a horde of simple recruits. Some even felt that their background made them cultural guides for the humble soldier. "The anonymous soldiery . . . are commonly inarticulate," Amos N. Wilder pointed out in his memoirs many years later, "but their collaboration may often be animated by deeper realities than those generally invoked. The cause of the preservation of European civilization," he described the motivation he and his fellow ambulanciers supposedly employed, "transcended that of any narrow patriotism."23 Where the USAAS stood for generic soldiery and subordination, in other words, the AFS represented culture and moral custodianship.

The symbol of the organization’s glory days, the club house and headquarters at 21 rue Raynouard, closed its doors in 1919. Nevertheless, the AFS, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Andrew, rolled into the twenties. Ambulance veterans still united under the banner of elitism and toasted themselves as having been a vanguard. "As time goes on . . .," one AFS publication read, "you will tell with pride that you were a volunteer ahead of the draft."24 And another driver declared that he had "already thrown my U.S. uniform into the discard, but I would not part with my [A.] F.S. coat for millions."25 In May 1920, a reunion in New York City drew six hundred former drivers, who felt much the same way. Jules Jusserand, Andrew, Sleeper, and former rival Eliot Norton par-

24American Field Service Association 3 (December 1920), 3.
25American Field Service Bulletin 7 (26 April 1919), [34].
ticipated. As Myron T. Herrick explained in his speech, AFS veterans could be proud to have been the "privates in this Ambulance army."  

France remained the reference point for this nostalgia. Let "us not be too proud of the part we have played," Andrew told his men in 1919. "Let us humbly remember that we have only been in the war for one year and seven months, while France has given all her energies, all of her resources in man and material." In 1920, the American Field Service Association emerged from the old AFS as a veteran's organization and to sponsor American college students in their studies in what had once been the symbol of their patrician cultural ideals. "The best will always understand the best," the Bulletin explained about the newly created university exchange scholarships, the French Fellowships, which brought American college students to France.

In World War II, the AFS would again send ambulances with volunteer drivers to the aid of France. Some drivers who had seen ambulance service in World War I once more took hold of the steering wheel (now of an all-terrain Dodge) and again aided her struggle against Germany. Before the end of the war, AFS ambulance cars also served in various parts of Africa, Burma, Italy, and other parts of Europe. After 1945, the organization under Andrew's former aide, Stephen Galatti, turned to High School exchanges between Europe and the United States. Soon, other countries were added. Today, the AFS organizes exchange programs among fifty countries. What began as an educational organization coming to the aid of cultural ideals associated with the Allied cause thus transformed its mission, but remained dedicated to initiating experiences, now of a young middle-class.

Andrew himself finally managed to enter Congress after returning home from France. He served as a Representative of his Massachusetts district from 1921 until his death in 1936. In Congress he continued the battle for France by arguing for a reduction of her war debts. At the same time, the Republican Congressman supported a large and efficient Navy. The former Inspector-General, furthermore, became instrumental in organizing the American Legion and was elected first commander of its Gloucester post. He died in the spring of 1936 of cerebral thrombosis at his home in Gloucester. Richard Norton died soon after he abandoned Kean and the military. The gentleman ambulancier had passed away in August 1918.

The disappearance of Norton's American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps, and the transformed existence of Andrew's American Ambulance Field Service fittingly symbolized the larger changes in which these men participated. Indeed, the very name of their organizations itself hinted at the nature of this change. Norton's high regard for the idea of the heroic "Volunteer," a self-reliant dedication to abstract ideals, lost much of its former appeal after the Great War. In postwar America, it was Andrew's altered concept

27 American Field Service Bulletin 87 (26 April 1919).
of "service" which could adapt to new circumstances. As David Kennedy has pointed out, the term "service" provided contemporaries with a term depicting the hinge between individual and collective eras. During the period of American neutrality, Andrew had indicated this very ambivalence by offering individual sacrifice on the firing line, on the one hand, and making this sacrifice part of a "service" catering to the French Army, on the other. In this way, the Inspector-General left us with an idea of individual dedication which connotes not merely abstract ideals, but a less idealistic reality and a marketplace in which the idea of "service" has become quite mundane.

This very change, however, might have not been advantageous in the eyes of Randolph Bourne, had he lived to see the twenties. The decade following World War I, while successfully abandoning notions of knights and heroic chivalry, replaced them with the materialism so well depicted in the novels of F. Scott Fitzgerald. As Robert Wiebe has argued, in the twenties matured a "bureaucratic orientation," effectively replacing earlier aesthetic ideals with concepts of efficiency.

The youth to which Bourne appealed, furthermore, found no easy way in which to replace the crusading spirit of their elders with notions as hopeful and romantic as those employed by the intellectual in 1917. Many of the very men who drove ambulances for Andrew and Norton now set the tone for a harsh, unromantic, disillusioned, and even existentialist atmosphere. E. E. Cummings, for example, described his experience as driver for Norton's squad not as heroic sacrifice; in fact, he did not describe his experience of heroically steering ambulances along the front at all. Rather, in stark contrast to cultural notions tied to France by his commander, Cummings focused his narration in The Enormous Room on his experience as a prisoner in a French concentration camp. And Ernest Hemingway, ambulance driver with the Red Cross in Italy in 1918, made one of his characters say that he

was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice. . . . We had heard them . . . and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by bill-posters over other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it.

Gone were the romantic and antiquated ideas employed by Norton and Andrew. If Norton had held on to them with dedication, they had already waned with the steady repetition of Andrew's movie reels. By the 1920s, their appeal had faded, and so, some former ambulance volunteers found, had the youthful, promising, and hopeful alternatives Bourne had in mind when he criticized his fellow countrymen for following the siren call of knightly rhetoric in 1917.

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31Kennedy, Over Here, 153-54.
32Wiebe, Search for Order, 148-49.
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