[Last change 20190926]
ONTOLOGY – PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTICS – KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF – MIND – BELIEF CHANGE – PROPERTIES – PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC – LOGIC / in no particular order
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Replace “takatuka” by “frankfurt”!
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Extensions and projections in Deontic Default Logic (2018) PDF
(Sequel to “Deontic modals: Why abandon the default appraoch”, 2017) It is argued that John Horty’s proposal for deontic default logics does not extend beyond very simple default theories without losing its intended interpretation. The principal impediment can be removed by basing default inference on projections rather than extensions.
Deontic modals: Why abandon the default appraoch (2017) PDF
John Horty has proposed an approach to reasoning with ought-propositions which stands in contrast to the standard modal approach to deontic logic. Horty’s approach is based on default theories as known from the framework of Default Logic. It is argued that the approach cannot be extended beyond the most simple kinds of default theories and that it fails in particular to account for conditional obligations. The most plausible ways of straightening out the defects of the approach conform to a simple theory of default reasoning in standard deontic language.
Blogging Gödel: His ontological argument in the public eye (2015). PDF Gödel’s ontological argument appears to be the most “technical” of all arguments for the existence of God. Surprisingly, it is also the one that has lately received the most public attention. In 2013 and 2014 magazines and journals published articles on Gödel’s ontological proof. One of them was accompanied by a blog in which readers could register their comments. The result is a unique corpus documenting how laymen respond to philosophical arguments to conclusions of general and immediate interest.
Knowability as potential knowledge (2014). PDF The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. We compare our interpretation with the rephrasal of knowability proposed by Edgington and Rabinowicz and Segerberg, inserting an actuality-operator. This proposal shares some key features with ours but suffers from requiring specific transworld-knowledge. We observe that potential knowledge involves no transworld-knowledge. We describe the logic of potential knowledge by providing models for interpreting the new operator. Finally we show that the knowability thesis can be added to elementary conditions on potential knowledge without collapsing modal distinctions.
Logik in der philosophischen Lehre (2012). PDF Ein kritischer Blick auf Lehrbücher der Logik in deutscher Sprache. Die in “Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie” veröffentlichte Version enhält einen Druckfehler, der bei einem “Gegenrezensenten” gleich Verwirrung stiftete. Die Herausgeber konnten sich nicht dazu entschließen, den Fehler sachgerecht zu korrigieren. Hier im Download der richtige Text.
Theories of belief change (2011). PDF A survey paper. Covers classical AGM as well as its translation into a multimodal language (Dynamic Doxastic Logic, DDL). The printed version (in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology) contained a mistake which is here corrected.
Existenz und Notwendigkeit: Kurt Gödels axiomatische Theologie (2005). PDF Eine Arbeit über Gödels Version des onotologischen Gottesbeweises und einige Varianten.
An Essay on Contraction (1997). PDF DVI Out-of-print monograph on classical AGM, base and multiple contraction, and their associated revision functions, merge (“consolidation”), propositional subtraction etc.
Vorlesung Logik (“Winterlogik”), Februar 2018. Zum Anschauen auf dem Bildschirm (ca. 8 Mb) oder zum Ausdrucken (ca. 2,5 Mb).
Vorlesung Philosophische Logik (“Sommerlogik”), Oktober 2018. PDF
Teorias de Mudanças de Crenças (Dinâmica Doxástica). PDF. Versão em Português das palestras acima.
Introduction to Two-Dimensional Semantics (2009). A crash-course including a package of essential readings. From temporal and other indexical discourse to theories of the a priori. PDF
Was ist so gut an (guter) Logik?. PDF. Eine Einführung in ein wenig Logik und deren Philosophie. Vortrag gelegentlich gehalten für ein Publikum mit wenig Vorwissen über Logik.
A long CV (in English or German) with list of publications is available on request.
Há também um Currículo Lattes na página do CnPq. Este currículo está sendo mais atualizado.
Geboren 1958 in Essen (Ruhr). Studium in Marburg (1979-83), St.Andrews (Schottland, 1983-84; MPhil 1984) und an der Australian National University (ANU; PhD 1988) in Canberra (1985-88).
Von 1989 bis 2002 an der Universität Konstanz; bis zur Habilitation (1995) als Hochschulassistent am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Jürgen Mittelstraß, dann als Hochschuldozent, zuletzt als Heisenberg-Stipendiat. Während dieser Zeit Gastaufenthalte bzw. Gastprofessuren an der Indiana University in Bloomington (1993), an der Columbia University in New York (1994) und an der Bundesuniversität von Rio de Janeiro (mehrmals). Heinz Meier Leibnitz-Preis 1993 für Kognitionswissenschaften.
Von 2002 bis 2006 Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie in Sao Paulo (Brasilien).
Seit 2006 Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Philosophie mit Schwerpunkt Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie (seit 2009 zugleich kooptierter Professor für Linguistik) an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main.
Born 1958 in Essen (Germany). Undergraduate studies in Marburg (1979-83). Graduate studies in St.Andrews (1983-84, MPhil 1984) and at the Institute of Advanced Studies of the ANU (1985-88, PhD 1988).
From 1989 to 2002 at the University of Konstanz as post-doc and research fellow (Hochschulassistent, Hochschuldozent, Heisenberg-Fellow). Various visiting positions at Indiana University in Bloomington, Columbia University, and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Heinz-Meier-Leibnitz-Prize for work in Cognitive Science (1993).
From 2002 to 2006 full professor of philosophy (titular) at the São Judas Tadeu University in São Paulo (Brazil).
Since 2006 Chair of Theoretical Philosophy (main area: logic) at the Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main. Secondary appointment as Professor of Linguistics since 2009.
Editorial boards (present): Erkenntnis, Theoria; (past): Studia Logica, Manuscrito.
External member of the Centro de Ética e Filosofia da Mente (CEFM) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
You will find me in the Australasian Philosophy Family Tree: W.V. Quine > David Lewis > Richard Routley > AF
See also the Philosophy Family Tree
My Erdös-number (of the first and second, “pure” kind) is 4: Harvey Friedman > Robert K. Meyer > Richard Routley V Edwin Mares > AF
Kauß and Telles can be contacted in room IG 2.556, tel. +49 (0)69 798 32809.