SoSe 2017 Semantics 2

Conventional Implicature

Definites

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7.6.2017

Homework

- Portfolio task: Choose three different CIs.
  - For each of them, show that they are CIs,
  - give the semantic representation of a simple sentence,
  - indicate what is at issue, what is CI
  - Sketch the lexical entry of the CI-trigger

The young man then ate the meal, and departed.

CI The young man did not eat the meal before

∂I Tym ate the meal and left

(S_1) then S_2

CI before: ¬S_2

Alex believes that tym then ate the meal, but he had eaten it earlier already.

⇒ Presup?

CI S_1 Stout S_2

Alex believes that
Chris is not but
intelligent.
However being not
doesn't nec. ~~mean~~
mean that you are
stupid.

#Alex glaubt, dass
Sie krank sind
aber wir denken uns
doch.

Alex ate the apple meal

1) the apple is gone

2) the apple existed before

The warrior went on studying Axel then taught himself and laughed.

CI warrior studied A before

CI studying unconscious

go on

1) The u. did not go on studying A.

> T.U. studied A before ✓

2) Did the u. go on ...

> ✓

3) if ... , the ✓

Chris believes that the u. went on studying A but, in fact the u. had not been studying A before.

They only had 1 candidate.

AI: They didn't have more than 1 candidate

Presup

CI: They had one candidate

~~They~~ Chris ever ~~had~~ went on vacation in winter.

They bel. that Chris ....

but we all know that Chris goes to Finnland for Christmas every year.

Questions from last week

Goal of today's meeting

Formalize some CIs

Integrate them into LRS+projective meaning

LRS combinatorics

- New list-valued feature CI
- CI percolates until it is retrieved
- CI-retrieval possible outside the scope of semantic operators.

Completely independent CI

Chris hat Sie/dich angerufen.

Chris called you.form/inform

Sem: call$_2$(chris, you)

CI: formal-rel$_2$(I, you)

EX-COM call$_2$(chris, you) ∧ f-r$_2$(I, you)

Alex got a damn dog/mutt.

Sem: ∃x(dog(x) have$_2$(alex, x))

CI:

chis-l$_2$

∃y(chis-l$_2$(y, x))

∃x(dog(x): own$_2$(alex, x) ∧ ∃y(d$_2$(y, x)))

Alex hat keine Katze

Hat Alex schon irgendwann

ein Kätzer ?

CI Kätzer

$\exists y \forall x (\text{dog}(x) : \text{ähnlich}(y, x))$

Alex hat ein Kätzer

$\exists x (\text{dog}(x) : \text{besitzt}(\text{alex}, x))$

$\wedge \exists y \forall x (\text{dog}(x) : \text{ähnlich}(y, x))$

Appositions



Lance Amstrong, APP the cyclist, battled cancer.

at issue: $b\text{-}c_1(e_a)$

CI: $cyclist_1(e_a)$

EX-CONT: $b\text{-}c_1(e_a) \wedge cyclist_1(e_a)$

at issue

CI

Lexical specification of APP:

APP

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{VAL} \begin{bmatrix} \text{SUBJ} \langle\rangle \\ \text{SPR} \langle\rangle \\ \text{COMPS} \langle \text{NP}[\text{DR}\ (a)] \rangle \end{bmatrix} \\ \text{MOD} \langle \text{NP}[\text{DR}\ (a)] \rangle \\ \text{PARTS} \langle \alpha[(2)] \wedge \beta[(1)] \rangle \\ \text{CI} \langle \beta \rangle \end{bmatrix}$$

CI takes material from the at issue content

Unfortunately, Kim is sick.

At issue: sick$_1$(kim)

CI: sad-about$_2$(I, ^sick$_1$(k))

EX-CONT:

Lexical entry of unfortunately:

I don't believe that unfortunately K. is sick.

[MOD S[DTR(1)]
PARTS ⟨ sick$_1$(I, ^α[(1)]), ^sad$_2$ ⟩]

leider
unglücklicherweise
bedauerlicherweise

Ich glaube nicht, dass Kim {#leider / !b.e.u} krank ist.

b.e.u

CI: sick$_1$(k) ⊃ sad-about$_2$(I, ^sick$_1$(k))

CI takes material from the at issue content

Thora is a baby, but she is (usually) quiet.

Sem: baby(Thora) ∧ quiet(Thora)

CI: EXPECT baby(H') ⊃ ¬ quiet(H')



lexical specification of but:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{VAL} & \begin{bmatrix} \text{SPR} & \langle S[\text{DR}(\boxed{1})] \rangle \\ \text{COMPS} & \langle S[\text{DR}(\boxed{2})] \rangle \end{bmatrix} \\ \text{PARTS} & \langle \alpha[\boxed{1}] \wedge \beta[\boxed{2}], \text{exp}(\alpha \supset \neg\beta), \neg\beta \rangle \\ \text{CI} & \langle \text{expect}(\boxed{1}, \supset \neg\beta) \rangle \end{bmatrix}$$

baby(H) ∧ quiet(H)

∧ expect(speaker, (baby(H) ⊃ ¬ quiet(H)))

CIs: What to do with them?

- CIs are triggered by lexical items and/or constructions
- They are not at-issue and project over negation, and attitude predicates, though, probably, not over embedded speech operators
- They are truth-conditionally independent of the embedding sentence
- They typically contribute material that is not fully given in the context, but do not put it out for discussion

Definites

Definite NPs

Sheldon: the person called Sheldon

every physicist: the totality of ph.

the waitress:

Sheldon's flatmate: the flatmate of Sh.

this physicist:

Reality check

Watch

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKeU3bzQFIs

and identify definite NPs

Existence
Uniqueness
→ contextually restricted
"Familiarity"

Definite NPs pattern with proper nouns

- Existence, uniqueness, familiarity
- Truth conditions?
  > The cow calved.
  > The cow didn't calve.
- Presupposition

Definite NPs pattern with proper nouns:

Lack of scope ambiguity with negation

Penny didn't talk to every physicist. $\forall \neg$ / $\neg \forall$

Penny didn't talk to Howard. $\neg$ talk (p, h)

Penny didn't talk to the engineer.

Lack of scope ambiguity with quantifiers

Most physicists like a waitress. MOST $\exists$ / $\exists$ MOST

Most physicists like Penny.

Most physicists like the waitress.

Definite NPs don't pattern with proper names:
Dependence on quantifiers

Every physicist likes Penny.

Every physicist likes the waitress that he knows.

Definite NPs don't pattern with proper nouns:

Dependence on scenario/context

Sheldon doesn't like the new Star Wars movie. in 1980 in 2005

Sheldon doesn't like "The Empire Strikes Back".

Sheldon doesn't like "The Revenge of the Sith".

For next week

- Portfolio task: -
- Read:
  > the section on definites from the LRS textbook: Section 6.6 (don't get confused by the slightly different notation, i.e. we write: cow*x instead of cow1(x), and we have an extra "event" argument for verbs, i.e. instead of calve(x), we write: calve*e*x, where e is the event of calving.
  > Sailer & Am-David 2016

References

Potts, Christopher. 2007. Into the conventional-implicature dimension. *Philosophy Compass* 4(2):665-679. http://web.stanford.edu/~cgpotts/papers/potts-conventional-implicature-compass.pdf

Sailer, Manfred, & Am-David, Assif. 2016. Definite meaning and definite marking. In Arnold, Doug, Butt, Miriam, Crysmann, Berthold, King, Tracy Holloway, & Müller, Stefan (Eds.): *Proceedings of the Joint 2016 Conference on Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar and Lexical Functional Grammar, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland* (pp. 641–661). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications

http://csli-publications.stanford.edu/HeadLex/2016